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95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION*
WILLIAM S. DODGE**
What happens when Chevron deference meets the presumption
against extraterritoriality? Many statutes with potential
extraterritorial applications are administered by federal agencies.
Should courts determine the geographic scope of such statutes for
themselves by applying the presumption? Or should courts defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of geographic scope? Are
agencies free to change their interpretations of a statute’s
geographic scope or to interpret that scope differently than courts
have?
This Article argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality
should be incorporated at step two of the Chevron framework.
Courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a
statute’s geographic scope if the agency has considered the
normative values that underlie the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, not all
normative canons are applied at Chevron step one; moreover, the
presumption against extraterritoriality never has been. Agency
interpretations of geographic scope should receive deference
because agencies are likely to have a better understanding than
courts of statutory purposes, regulatory options, and potential
conflicts with foreign interests. Agencies can also calibrate
extraterritorial regulation to maximize effectiveness and minimize
conflicts far better than courts. Finally, this Article argues that
agencies may change their minds about geographic scope and that
they are free to depart from lower court decisions applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality and perhaps even from
Supreme Court decisions applying the presumption.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a world where transactions, information, pollution, and
many other things cross national borders. In such a world, nations often
have a legitimate interest in regulating persons or conduct outside their
territories. Many U.S. statutes clearly indicate that they apply
extraterritorially.1 Others say nothing about their geographic scope.2

1. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012) (prohibiting
bribery of foreign officials); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), -1(b), -1(c)(2) (2012)
(extending Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination to U.S. citizens employed in
foreign countries, but exempting discrimination required by foreign law and discrimination by
foreign companies not controlled by U.S. companies).
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When U.S. courts have to determine the scope of a statute for
themselves, they typically employ a presumption against
extraterritoriality.3
But sometimes a statute that says nothing about its geographic
scope also gives an administrative agency authority to interpret the
statute. In a few instances, Congress expressly delegates to an
administrative agency the authority to determine the geographic scope
of the statute.4 In most instances, Congress does not, and whatever
authority the agency might have to determine the statute’s scope is a
function of its more general interpretive authority. Under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,5 courts generally
must defer to a reasonable interpretation of a statute by an agency
exercising delegated lawmaking authority.6 And under Skidmore v. Swift
& Co.,7 even when an agency is not exercising delegated lawmaking
authority, courts may defer to agency interpretations to the extent they
are persuasive.8 Where does the presumption against extraterritoriality
fit into this framework of deference? Are questions of geographic scope
different from other questions of statutory interpretation, or should they
be treated similarly?
These questions have significant implications for extraterritorial
regulation. For decades, agency regulations have defined the geographic
scope of the registration requirements under the Securities Act9 and the
premerger notification requirements of Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
2. See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2012); Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
3. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100–01 (2016)
(applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s (“RICO’s”) substantive provisions
and private right of action); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)
(applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of
Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991) (applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prior to its 1991 amendment).
4. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 30(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2012) (giving the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) authority to make rules governing certain
transactions “on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”).
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. Id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).
7. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
8. Id. at 140 (noting that an agency’s interpretations “constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment” that may have the “power to persuade”); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (holding that an agency interpretation not entitled to
deference under Chevron is still “eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness”
under Skidmore).
9. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–.905 (2016).
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Improvements Act (“HSR”).10 More recently, agency regulations have
defined the geographic scope of the so-called “Volcker Rule” under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank Act”), which prohibits banks from proprietary trading.11 If
questions of geographic scope must be decided exclusively by courts
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, these regulations
may be invalid.
If, on the other hand, agency interpretations of geographic scope
are entitled to deference under Chevron and Skidmore, then court
decisions applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to agencyadministered statutes may be merely provisional.12 In Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd.,13 for example, the Supreme Court of the
United States applied the presumption to hold that § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act14 extends only to fraud involving transactions in
the United States.15 If Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
interpretations of § 10(b)’s geographic scope are entitled to Chevron
deference, the SEC might use its delegated rulemaking authority
effectively to reverse Morrison.16
Courts are divided on how the presumption against
extraterritoriality fits into the Chevron-Skidmore framework. One
district court has held that the presumption is a traditional tool of

10. 16 C.F.R. §§ 802.50–.52 (2016).
11. 12 C.F.R. § 44.6(e) (2016).
12. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for
agency discretion.”). For a prescient article discussing this question, see Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002).
13. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
15. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. For further discussion of Morrison, see infra Section III.D.
16. See infra Section VI.B. This Article also suggests that the SEC might use its
regulatory authority in a more limited way to solve other problems that have arisen after
Morrison. For example, Joseph Grundfest has raised the concern that Morrison may
effectively preclude aftermarket buyers from bringing claims under § 11 of the Securities Act
and proposes a number of steps the SEC might take to address the problem. See Joseph A.
Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, and Prospects
for Regulatory Reform, 41 J. CORP. L. 1, 48–69 (2015). While consideration of § 11 is beyond
the scope of this Article, its analysis suggests that the SEC could address this problem much
more directly by using its authority under § 19 of the Securities Act to define the geographic
scope of § 11, even if its interpretation departs from Morrison’s. See infra note 339 and
accompanying text (discussing Securities Act § 19 in the context of Regulation S).
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statutory interpretation to be applied at Chevron step one.17 Two circuits
have suggested that an agency interpretation applying a statute
extraterritorially might be entitled to deference under Chevron or
Skidmore if the agency could point to some basis for that interpretation
in the statute.18 And one circuit has suggested that an agency
interpretation could be considered reasonable at Chevron step two if
there were “some indication that the agency has considered the effect of
the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . .”19
Scholarly opinion is also divided. Some treat the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a canon of construction to be applied at
Chevron step one.20 Others have argued that the presumption should be
applied at Chevron step two so that courts should defer to reasonable
interpretations of a statute’s geographic scope by agencies exercising
delegated lawmaking authority.21 Professor Cass Sunstein has been on
both sides of the question. Initially, he suggested that the presumption
against extraterritoriality “probably cannot be defeated by the agency’s
contrary view.”22 More recently, in an article co-authored with Professor
17. Souryal v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 (E.D. Va.
2012).
18. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is far from
clear that an agency’s assertion that a statute has extraterritorial effect, unmoored from any
plausible statutory basis for rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, should be
given [Chevron] deference.”); Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Because the Director cites no textual evidence of Congress’s clear intention to
authorize the extraterritorial application of the Act, the Director’s interpretation lacks
persuasive force [under Skidmore].”).
19. Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
20. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency NormEntrepreneurship, 115 YALE. L.J. 2623, 2629 & n.33 (2006) (referring to presumption against
extraterritoriality as a “clear statement rule[] relevant to Step One”). For discussion of the
Chevron framework, see infra Section I.A.
21. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 694 (2000) (arguing that the presumption against extraterritoriality “reflects a desire to
push certain issues away from the courts, not a preference for congressional as opposed to
Executive determination”); Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2014) (noting that “the extraterritoriality question is
exactly the sort of statutory ambiguity for which the [Chevron] doctrine was designed”); see
also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
JURISDICTION § 203 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“If Congress has
not spoken directly to the geographic scope of a statutory provision, courts in the United
States must defer to a reasonable construction of the statute by an administering agency
exercising delegated lawmaking authority.”).
22. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2114–15 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 333 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons] (“[A]gencies are not permitted to apply statutes outside of the
territorial borders of the United States. If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it
must be as a result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this effect.” (footnote omitted)).

95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

916

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

Eric Posner, Sunstein argued “that in cases in which the executive has
adopted an interpretation via rulemaking or adjudication, or is
otherwise entitled to deference under standard principles of
administrative law, the executive’s interpretations should prevail over
the comity doctrines,” the presumption against extraterritoriality among
them.23
This Article argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality
is properly applied at Chevron step two and that courts must therefore
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of a statute’s geographic
scope.24 First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, not all canons of
interpretation are applied at Chevron step one.25 Second, again contrary
to the conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court has never applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality at step one. Rather, it has
suggested that the presumption should be incorporated at step two of
the Chevron analysis.26 Third, and most important, agencies are in a far
better position than courts to weigh and apply the normative values that
23. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007). While this Article agrees with Posner and Sunstein about agency
interpretations of geographic scope, it does not endorse Posner and Sunstein’s more
expansive argument that courts should defer to the executive branch in applying comity
doctrines outside the context of administrative law. See id. at 1205. To the contrary, I have
argued that deference to case-specific determinations by the executive branch undermines
both the rule of law and the foreign relations interests of the United States. See William S.
Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2132–40 (2015).
Chevron and Skidmore deference are not case-specific—rather, they establish interpretations
of statutes that courts apply across all cases.
24. This argument is subject to the important limitation that the agency’s interpretation
does not violate international law. Under the so-called Charming Betsy canon, “an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804);
see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDICTION § 205 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“Where fairly
possible, U.S. courts construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law
governing jurisdiction to prescribe. Where a federal statute cannot be so construed, the
federal statute is controlling as a matter of U.S. law.”). Some scholars have taken the position
that Chevron deference with respect to the presumption against extraterritoriality should
extend to the Charming Betsy canon as well. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 21, at 685–90;
Clopton, supra note 21, at 44–45. I would distinguish the Charming Betsy canon on the ground
that the President is constitutionally bound to obey international law under the Take Care
Clause. See William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the
United States, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 21, 34–38 (2009). At a minimum,
because the constitutional authority of the executive branch to violate international law is not
clearly established, an agency interpretation that violates international law should be
reviewed at Chevron step one under the constitutional avoidance canon. See infra notes 96–98
and accompanying text (discussing application of the constitutional avoidance canon at
Chevron step one).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
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underlie the presumption against extraterritoriality. Agencies are likely
to have a better understanding of the statutory policy, the regulatory
options available to effectuate that policy, and the degree of conflict
with other countries that each option might cause. Agencies can also
calibrate their interpretations to a far greater degree than courts in order
to maximize the effectiveness of statutory policies while minimizing
conflicts with other nations.27
Beyond the practical implications of the question,28 this Article
makes contributions in two distinct areas. First, it adds to the substantial
literature on extraterritorial regulation in general and on the
presumption against extraterritoriality in particular.29 While other
articles have briefly considered the question of deference to agency
interpretations of geographic scope,30 none have attempted such a
comprehensive consideration.
27. See infra Part IV. This Article accords with recent literature arguing that questions of
foreign relations law should be treated similarly to purely domestic questions. See generally
Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015) (arguing that the Roberts Court no longer defers to the
executive branch in foreign affairs law); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (arguing that courts
properly treat foreign relations issues like domestic issues). But it is also possible to argue for
deference to administrative agencies from an exceptionalist perspective on the ground that
foreign relations concerns make deference to the Executive particularly important. See, e.g.,
Bradley, supra note 21, at 693 (citing “general understandings regarding executive branch
authority and expertise” in international relations); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1207
(arguing that “the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the foreign
relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting”).
28. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
29. For articles discussing extraterritoriality in various contexts, see generally Roger P.
Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European
Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1992); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1992); Curtis A. Bradley,
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997);
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14 (2007); Anthony J. Colangelo, What
Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303 (2014); William S. Dodge,
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998);
Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057
(2009); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341
(2014); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351
(2010); Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1387 (2014); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010); Gerald L. Neuman,
Extraterritoriality and the Interests of the United States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1441 (2014); Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009).
30. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 691–94; Clopton, supra note 21, at 35–43; Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1204–07.
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Second, with respect to administrative law, this Article contributes
to the literature concerning the place of interpretive canons under
Chevron and Skidmore. The majority view is that all canons of
interpretation should be applied at Chevron step one.31 But some
scholars have argued that normative canons should be applied at
Chevron step two.32 This Article suggests that normative canons fall into
three categories: (1) those that operate as non-delegation rules and must
be applied at Chevron step one; (2) those that properly apply at Chevron
step two when a court determines whether an agency’s interpretation of
a statute is reasonable; and (3) those whose application is foreclosed by
an agency’s interpretation of a statute. The presumption against
extraterritoriality is an important example—though by no means the
only example—of a step-two normative canon.
Part I introduces the two frameworks for statutory interpretation
relevant to this Article—deference to administrative agencies under
Chevron and Skidmore, and the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Part II looks at how the Supreme Court has treated other canons of
interpretation within the Chevron framework. It distinguishes canons
applied at Chevron step one, canons applied at Chevron step two, and
canons whose application may be foreclosed by agency interpretations
of a statute.
Part III looks at what the Supreme Court has already said about
deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope, concluding that
the Court has applied the normal rules of deference to questions of
geographic scope, that the Court has never applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one but has suggested that it
could be applied at step two, and that the Court has in fact deferred to
agencies on questions of geographic scope. Part IV argues that
incorporating the presumption against extraterritoriality at step two of
the Chevron analysis makes sense because agencies are better than
31. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (noting majority view “that courts should continue
to interpret legislation independently when normative canons would apply, even when
Congress has charged a particular agency with the statute’s administration”).
32. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 206 (2006) (“[J]udges should defer to agencies’
choices about whether, when, and how to employ the traditional tools where a linguistic gap
or ambiguity exists in the provision immediately at hand.”); Bamberger, supra note 31, at 111
(“[I]n reviewing otherwise deference-deserving agency constructions, the canon inquiry
should be incorporated into Chevron’s second-step analysis of the agency construction’s
reasonableness.”). A recent student note has also attempted to distinguish normative canons
that should be applied at Chevron step one from those that should be applied at Chevron step
two. See generally Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinction, 124
HARV. L. REV. 594 (2010).
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courts at understanding statutory purpose, evaluating alternatives,
assessing foreign relations implications, and calibrating extraterritorial
regulatory schemes.
Part V considers in greater detail just how the presumption against
extraterritoriality may be incorporated at Chevron step two. This Part
first considers and rejects the argument that the form of delegation
matters—that is, that either an express delegation of authority to
regulate extraterritorially or a clear indication of extraterritoriality in
the statute should be a precondition to deference. Part V next considers
four possible models for evaluating reasonableness, concluding that
courts should uphold an agency’s interpretation of a provision’s
geographic scope if the agency considered the normative values
reflected in the presumption, even if the agency did not apply the
presumption itself. Part V then tests these models by providing three
examples in which agencies have interpreted the geographic scope of
statutes they administer: HSR, Regulation S, and the Volcker Rule. It
concludes that each of these interpretations should be held reasonable at
Chevron step two.
Finally, Part VI considers two implications from this conclusion.
Section VI.A concludes that agencies are free to change their
interpretations of a provision’s geographic scope in response to changing
circumstances, changing policy views, or both. Section VI.B considers
whether agencies may depart from the geographic scope that federal
courts applying the presumption have given a statutory provision. It
concludes that the answer is clearly yes with respect to the
interpretations of lower federal courts. With respect to Supreme Court
decisions, the answer depends on whether the Court decides to extend
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services (“Brand X”)33 to its own decisions. In sum, deference to
administrative agencies will not only produce better interpretations of
geographic scope in the first instance but will also provide a mechanism
for such interpretations to change.
I. TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Deference to administrative agencies and the presumption against
extraterritoriality are two different frameworks for statutory
interpretation. Sometimes only one of these frameworks comes into
play. Some statutes interpreted by agencies have no extraterritorial
application, and some statutes with extraterritorial application are not

33. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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interpreted by agencies. But often both frameworks apply.34 Before
considering their interaction, it may be useful to review each framework
independently.
A. Deference to Administrative Agencies
Although the Supreme Court had long grappled with questions of
deference to administrative interpretations of statutes, its 1984 decision
in Chevron articulated a new framework35—one that the Court has
elaborated and applied ever since.36 At step one of the Chevron analysis,
the question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”37 To ascertain Congress’s
intent at step one, a court employs “traditional tools of statutory
construction,”38 tools that include some—but not all—of the canons of
statutory interpretation.39 At Chevron step two, “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.”40
Chevron based its regime of deference on a theory of delegation: “If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation.”41 Importantly, Chevron also
applied a rule of deference to implicit delegations of authority:
“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”42 Chevron

34. For discussion of a few important examples, see infra Section V.C.
35. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984).
36. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868–71 (2013) (holding that
courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction).
37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
38. Id. at 843 n.9.
39. See infra Part II.
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
41. Id. at 843–44. With respect to express delegations, the Court said “[s]uch legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 844 (citations omitted). Whether Chevron’s arbitrary and capricious standard
for express delegations and its reasonableness standard for implicit delegations are one and
the same is a question this Article need not resolve. Questions of extraterritoriality usually,
though not always, involve implicit delegations.
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buttressed its framework with notions of agency expertise43 and
accountability.44 In recent cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
its regime of deference to administrative agency “is rooted in a
background presumption of congressional intent.”45 If Congress left an
agency-administered statute ambiguous, it “understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows.”46
There are, of course, questions preliminary to Chevron’s two steps:
whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency in the first place, and whether the agency in fact exercised that
authority. These questions have been called Chevron step zero.47 To find
that Congress has delegated interpretive authority, a court need not
determine that “the particular issue was committed to agency
discretion.”48 It suffices that Congress has vested an agency “with
general authority to administer [a statute] through rulemaking and
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.”49 But even if the agency has interpretive
authority, its views will not be given Chevron deference unless the
agency has actually exercised that authority. In Negusie v. Holder,50 for
example, the Court found that the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) had not exercised its interpretive authority under the
Immigration and Nationality Act because the BIA mistakenly thought
itself bound by an earlier Supreme Court decision.51
If an agency interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference,
either because the agency lacks interpretive authority or because it
failed to exercise that authority, that interpretation may still be entitled
to a lesser degree of deference under Skidmore based on its “power to
persuade.”52 In United States v. Mead Corp.,53 the Supreme Court made
43. Id. at 865 (noting that agencies may have “great expertise” and that “[j]udges are not
experts”).
44. Id. (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices . . . .”).
45. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
46. Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
47. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
873 (2001) (describing the threshold inquiries as “step zero”).
48. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
49. Id.
50. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
51. Id. at 522. The Court remanded to the agency to interpret the statute and apply that
interpretation to the case. Id. at 524.
52. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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clear that “Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an
agency’s interpretation may merit some deference, whatever its form,
given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and
information’ available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity
in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law
requires.”54 Deference to agency interpretations thus runs along a
continuum. As Mead put it, “[t]he fair measure of deference to an
agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”55
B.

The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

The presumption against extraterritoriality provides a separate
framework for statutory interpretation. Since 1991, the presumption has
been the Supreme Court’s principal tool for determining the geographic
scope of federal statutes.56 The modern presumption is based on two
rationales.57 First, “it serves to avoid the international discord that can
result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.”58 In
other words, it accounts for foreign interests.59 Second, the presumption
53. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
54. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139).
55. Id. at 228.
56. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100–01 (2016) (RICO);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013) (federal common law
cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 255 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
454–56 (2007) (Patent Act); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993)
(Immigration and Nationality Act); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993)
(Federal Tort Claims Act); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act). Before its 1991 decision in Aramco, the Supreme Court
had briefly invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989) (territorial tort exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act), but otherwise had not employed the presumption since
1949. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (Eight Hour Law).
57. Originally, the presumption against extraterritoriality was based on the so-called
Charming Betsy canon—that Congress does not intend to violate international law. See
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”). See generally Knox, supra note 29, (discussing original rationale). As international
law limits on jurisdiction weakened, new justifications for the presumption developed. See
Dodge, supra note 23, at 2092–93.
58. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.
59. The first rationale is sometimes expressed more narrowly as avoiding conflicts with
foreign law. See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (“This presumption ‘serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.’ ” (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248)). Because international discord
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“reflects the more prosaic ‘commonsense notion that Congress generally
legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’ ”60 Both these rationales are
grounded in congressional intent.61
As with Chevron, the Supreme Court has elaborated on this
framework over time. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,62
the Court even articulated—in what is surely a coincidence—two steps
in the analysis.63 At RJR step one, the Court asks “whether the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is,
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies
extraterritorially.”64 But the presumption is not a “clear statement
rule.”65 The Supreme Court has looked to “context,”66 “structure,”67 and
“legislative history”68 to determine whether the presumption has been
rebutted—in short, to all the tools of statutory interpretation that courts
normally employ.69
At RJR step two, if the presumption has not been rebutted, the
Court asks whether applying the statute would be domestic or
extraterritorial, and it does this “by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’ ”70
The Court first developed this “focus” approach in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd,71 a case interpreting the geographic scope of
Securities Exchange Act § 10(b),72 which prohibits fraud. There, the
plaintiffs argued that applying § 10(b) would be domestic because the
alleged fraud occurred in the United States.73 The Court concluded,
however, “that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place
may occur even in the absence of a conflict with foreign law, this Article treats the
presumption as designed to avoid conflicts with foreign interests, not just conflicts with
foreign law.
60. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (quoting Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5); see also Aramco,
499 U.S. at 248 (stating that unless Congress speaks clearly, “we must presume it ‘is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions’ ” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)).
61. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (describing presumption as “a valid approach whereby
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)).
62. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
63. See id. at 2101 (describing “two-step framework”); see also William S. Dodge, The
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 45
(2016).
64. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
65. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
66. Id.
67. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103.
68. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
69. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (looking to “all
available evidence”).
70. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
71. 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
73. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
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where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.”74 Because the focus of the provision was
not found in the United States—plaintiffs had purchased their shares
abroad—the Court held that applying § 10(b) would be extraterritorial.75
Different statutory provisions focus on different things. Some focus
on conduct,76 some on injuries,77 some on transactions,78 and some on
employment.79 If the provision’s focus is found in the United States, then
its application is considered domestic and permissible.80 If the
provision’s focus is not found in the United States, then application of
the provision is considered extraterritorial and impermissible.81
If, on the other hand, the presumption against extraterritoriality has
been rebutted at RJR step one, then the statute’s geographic scope
“turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s
foreign application, and not on the statute’s ‘focus.’ ”82 In RJR, for
example, the Supreme Court held that at least two of RICO’s
substantive provisions had rebutted the presumption by incorporating
predicate acts that clearly apply extraterritorially.83 It then refused to
impose further limits based on RICO’s alleged focus on the enterprise

74. Id.
75. Id. at 273.
76. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005) (explaining that the
Federal Wire Fraud Statute punishes fraudulent schemes in the United States even if the
object of the scheme is to defraud a foreign government).
77. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016) (“Section
1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or
property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries.”); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that antitrust laws “reflect a legislative effort
to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations
omitted)).
78. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (explaining that the focus of Securities Exchange
Act § 10(b) is “upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States”).
79. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) (stating
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prior to 1991 amendment, had a “purely domestic
focus”); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949) (stating that the federal Eight Hour
Law reflects “concern with domestic labor conditions”).
80. See, e.g., Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371 (upholding wire fraud convictions because
defendants executed the scheme inside the United States); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (permitting antitrust claims based on the alleged
conduct’s substantial effects in the United States).
81. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111 (dismissing civil RICO claims based
exclusively on foreign injury); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273 (dismissing securities claims based on
foreign transactions); Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165, 175 (dismissing antitrust claims based on
independent foreign injury and remanding for determination of domestic effects); Aramco,
499 U.S. at 259 (dismissing Title VII discrimination claims arising from employment abroad).
82. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
83. Id. at 2101–03; see also id. at 2103 (limiting holding to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b) and (c)
and declining to decide the geographic scope of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a) and (d)).
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being corrupted.84 Because there was “a clear indication at step one that
RICO applies extraterritorially,” the Court did “not proceed to the
‘focus’ step.”85
To summarize, the presumption against extraterritoriality rests on
congressional intent—more specifically, on a presumed desire to avoid
unnecessary conflict with other countries and on an assumption that
Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. The analysis
typically proceeds in two steps. At RJR step one, the court looks to see if
the presumption has been rebutted by a clear indication of
extraterritoriality, employing all the usual tools of statutory
interpretation. If the presumption has been rebutted at step one, then a
court applies the statute extraterritorially according to its terms, without
further limitations based on the statute’s focus. If the presumption has
not been rebutted at step one, then the court examines the provision’s
“focus” at RJR step two. If the provision’s focus is found in the United
States, then applying the statute is domestic and permissible; if the
provision’s focus is not found in the United States, then applying the
statute is extraterritorial and impermissible.
II. CANONS IN THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK
There are several ways that the presumption against
extraterritoriality might fit into the Chevron regime of deference to
administrative agencies. One option would be for a court to apply the
presumption at Chevron step one to resolve any ambiguity about a
statute’s geographic scope, leaving no question for the agency to
interpret. A second option would be for a court to apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step two, by deferring
to the agency’s application of the presumption or its weighing of the
normative considerations on which the presumption is based.86 A third
option would be for a court not to apply the presumption at all if the
agency has determined the geographic scope of the statute.
This Part looks at how the Supreme Court has treated other canons
of interpretation within the Chevron framework, showing—contrary to
the conventional wisdom—that not all canons are applied at Chevron
step one. The Supreme Court has applied the textual canons and some
84. Id. at 2103–04 (“[W]e do not need to determine which transnational (or wholly
foreign) patterns of racketeering [RICO] applies to; it applies to all of them, regardless of
whether they are connected to a ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic’ enterprise.”).
85. Id. at 2103. While the Court expressed a preference for taking the steps in this order,
it made clear that courts are not “preclude[d] . . . from starting at step two in appropriate
cases.” Id. at 2101 n.5.
86. Part V considers various ways to structure a step-two reasonableness analysis.
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normative canons at step one. But the Court has applied other
normative canons at Chevron step two when evaluating the
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation, and the Court has held
that an agency’s interpretation of a statute may render others
inapplicable.87 Understanding how the Supreme Court has treated
canons of interpretation in general prepares the way to consider how the
Supreme Court has treated the presumption against extraterritoriality in
particular, which is the subject of Part III.
A. Canons Applied at Step One
Describing step one in Chevron itself, the Supreme Court wrote
that “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”88 Certainly
some canons of interpretation fall into this category.
The clearest examples of step-one canons are the textual canons. In
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America,89 the Court invoked “[t]he
traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, . . . that ‘words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning’ ” to reject an agency’s
interpretation of a statute at step one.90 In National Credit Union
Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,91 the Court deployed
two other textual canons at step one: the rule against making statutory
language “surplusage”;92 and “the established canon of construction that
similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be
accorded a consistent meaning.”93 As Professor Elizabeth Garrett
explained, “[m]any textual (or syntactic) canons are guides to what a
particular statutory provision would typically mean to an ordinary
speaker of the language. They reflect shared linguistic conventions and
understandings, and thus they are helpfully, and uncontroversially, used
by courts at step one.”94
87. A few scholars have similarly recognized that normative canons differ in ways that
might affect their application within the Chevron framework. See Bamberger, supra note 31,
at 67 (“Normative canons . . . vary greatly in their formulation and their application.”); Note,
supra note 32, at 602–15 (distinguishing normative canons that should be applied at Chevron
step one from those that should not).
88. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
89. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
90. Id. at 36 (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1989)).
91. 522 U.S. 479 (1998).
92. Id. at 501.
93. Id. (citing Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 225
(1992)).
94. Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 69 (John F. Duffy
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Courts have also developed a set of normative canons that reflect
extra-statutory values.95 The Supreme Court has applied some of these
normative canons at step one of the Chevron analysis. Perhaps the best
example of a step-one normative canon is the constitutional avoidance
canon.96 In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council,97 the Court invoked the constitutional
avoidance canon to trump Chevron deference, concluding that “we must
independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not
raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed
to” the statutory provision.98 Similarly, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers,99 the Court concluded that it would not defer
to an “administrative interpretation [that] alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state
power.”100 And in INS v. St. Cyr,101 the Court held that the canon against
retroactive application of statutes applies at Chevron step one.102
Professor Cass Sunstein has defended applying normative canons
like these at Chevron step one as a “contemporary nondelegation

& Michael Herz eds., 2005). Occasionally, there have been suggestions that textual canons
should have less force when an agency has interpreted a statute. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 102 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because of the
deference given to agencies on matters about which the statutes they administer are silent,
however, expressio unius ought to have somewhat reduced force in this context.” (citations
omitted)); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1823, 1868 (2015) (arguing for reduced effect of textual canons “at least with respect to
the judicial review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations”).
95. See Bamberger, supra note 31, at 72; Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992).
Others refer to these as “substantive” canons. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV.
26, 68 (1994); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
96. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” (citations omitted)); see also
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing
this canon and other principles of constitutional avoidance).
97. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
98. Id. at 577.
99. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
100. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
101. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
102. Id. at 321 n.45 (“Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive
application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for
Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve.” (citation
omitted)).
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doctrine.”103 The idea is that, in some cases, “Congress must decide the
key questions on its own.”104 Because the nondelegation canons require
a clear statement from Congress at Chevron step one, they foreclose the
possibility of deference to the administrative agency at Chevron step
two. Sunstein notes that “[t]hese canons impose important constraints
on administrative authority, for agencies are not permitted to
understand ambiguous provisions to give them authority to venture in
certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary.”105
Originally, Sunstein placed the presumption against
extraterritoriality among these nondelegation canons.106 But Sunstein
later reconsidered this classification, arguing that the presumption
against extraterritoriality (along with a number of other “comity
doctrines”) “should not be treated as part of the court’s analysis under
Chevron Step One” and that “courts should defer to the executive’s
judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable,
or constitutionally questionable.”107 Emphasizing the executive branch’s
expertise in foreign affairs, he wrote that “resolution of statutory
ambiguities involves judgments of policy, and those judgments are best
made by the executive.”108
B.

Canons Applied at Step Two

Other normative canons have not been applied at Chevron step
one, but rather at step two, when a court determines whether an
agency’s interpretation of a statute is reasonable. A good example is the
presumption against preemption of state law.109 The Supreme Court has
103. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 316–17. As Sunstein notes, the
older nondelegation doctrine is generally thought to be dead, since the Supreme Court has
not struck down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds since 1935. See id. at 315.
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have similarly argued that some of the normative canons
amount to a form of constitutional lawmaking. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s new canons amount to a ‘backdoor’ version of
the constitutional activism that most Justices on the current Court have publicly
denounced.”).
104. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 317.
105. Id. at 330.
106. Id. at 332–33 (“[E]xtraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive judgments
involving international relations; such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking
process (in which the President of course participates). The executive may not make this
decision on its own.”).
107. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1179, 1204. Posner and Sunstein further argued
for Skidmore deference “even if the executive is not exercising delegated authority to make
rules or conduct adjudications.” Id. at 1205.
108. Id. at 1207.
109. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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given Chevron deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an
express preemption provision in a statute;110 to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of a substantive provision in a statute that would have the
effect of preempting state law;111 and to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of the preemptive effect of its own regulations.112 As the
Court explained in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,113 “the agency is uniquely
qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress,’ and, therefore, whether it should be preempted.”114
Even when an agency’s views on preemption are not entitled to
Chevron deference, the Court has still given them “some weight” under
Skidmore.115 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,116 the Court
deferred to an agency’s view of whether state tort law would interfere
with a regulatory standard, even though its view was expressed in its
brief rather than in the standard itself, because “[t]he agency is likely to
have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives
and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state
requirements.”117 In Wyeth v. Levine,118 the Court explained that, under
Skidmore, “[t]he weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness,

110. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (“[O]ur interpretation of the
pre-emption statute is substantially informed by those [FDA] regulations.”); id. at 496 (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to support “giving
substantial weight to the agency’s view of the statute” (other citation omitted)).
111. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1996) (rejecting argument
that presumption against preemption “trumps Chevron, and requires a court to make its own
interpretation of [the substantive provision] that will avoid (to the extent possible) preemption of state law”).
112. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985) (“The
FDA’s statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the
agency’s position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent . . . .” (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984))); see also
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where the
statute contains no clear pre-emption command, courts may infer that the administrative
agency has a degree of leeway to determine the extent to which governing statutes, rules,
regulations, or other administrative actions have pre-emptive effect.” (citing Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 505–06)).
113. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
114. Id. at 496 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
115. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
116. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
117. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496); see also Williamson v. Mazda
Motor of Am., Inc. 562 U.S. 323, 335–36 (2011) (giving weight to brief expressing agency
views of regulation’s preemptive effect).
118. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).

95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

930

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

consistency, and persuasiveness,”119 although the Court concluded that
the agency’s position in Wyeth did not “merit deference” under the
Skidmore standard.120
Professor Kenneth Bamberger has proposed that all the normative
canons “should be incorporated into Chevron’s second-step analysis of
the agency construction’s reasonableness.”121 Normative canons reflect
normative values, and “[t]he decision-making strength of agencies gives
them important institutional advantages in weighing the values reflected
by the canons as against the policies reflected in a statute.”122 An agency
may have better empirical knowledge about how a particular
interpretation would affect the values reflected in the canon.123 An
agency may also have “more access than courts to knowledge about
congressional will.”124 But Bamberger cautions that reasonableness
review at Chevron’s second step is not a blank check: “[C]ourts should
determine whether an agency policy sufficiently reflects the background
norm.”125 If not, courts should “essentially ‘remand’ the issue to the
agency to exercise (or not) whatever statutory discretion remained.”126
Bamberger points out that the prospect of meaningful judicial review
“can alter administrative behavior prospectively,”127 providing
“incentives for administrative accommodation of the underlying value in
the first instance.”128 In sum, the strengths of agency decision making
support the Supreme Court’s practice of applying at least some
normative canons at Chevron step two.129

119. Id. at 577 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).
120. Id.
121. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 111. Bamberger acknowledges that textual canons
should be applied at step one. See id. at 76 (“Inquiries into the statute’s text, structure, and
purpose, as well as traditional textual construction canons, fit well within that step’s positive
inquiry, and their continued application to regulatory statutes is uncontroversial.”).
122. Id. at 84.
123. See id. at 97 (“Where essentially empirical balancing governs a canon’s application, at
least, agency expertise can provide courts with the very type of information a robust analysis
of regulation’s impact on canonic norms would require.”).
124. Id. at 98.
125. Id. at 68.
126. Id. at 69.
127. Id. at 117.
128. Id. at 121.
129. Even if one does not agree with Bamberger that all normative canons should be
incorporated at Chevron step two, his arguments have particular traction with respect to the
presumption against extraterritoriality. See infra Part IV.
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Canons Foreclosed by Agency Interpretations

Other canons of statutory interpretation are applied neither at
Chevron step one nor at step two. Instead, the agency’s interpretation is
deemed to resolve the statutory ambiguity, making application of the
canon unnecessary. The best example of this sort of canon is the rule of
lenity.130
The rule of lenity has been described as a “venerable rule”
vindicating “the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held
accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain,
or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”131 Yet the
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the rule of lenity does
not apply at Chevron step one to clarify statutes and strip administering
agencies of their interpretive discretion.132 Occasionally, the Court has
suggested that the rule of lenity might be considered at step two “in
determining whether a particular agency interpretation is reasonable.”133
Most frequently, though, the Court has concluded that an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute makes the statute clear enough to
preclude applying the rule of lenity.134 In Lopez v. Davis,135 for example,
the Court agreed with the Bureau of Prisons that Congress had not
addressed how the bureau was to exercise its discretion under an early
release statute and that the bureau’s categorical exclusion from early
release of felons who possessed a firearm was reasonable.136 The Court
130. Questions of interpretive deference do not generally arise in criminal cases because of
the well-established rule that the prosecution’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not
entitled to deference. See United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014) (“[W]e have
never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”).
But see generally Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing that courts should give Chevron deference to executive branch
interpretations of criminal statutes).
131. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion).
132. In Solid Waste Agency, for example, the Court applied the constitutional avoidance
and federalism canons at step one, but specifically declined to address the rule of lenity in the
same way. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 & n.8
(2001); see also infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
133. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009).
134. In a statement respecting a denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia argued that considering
lenity after deference to administrative agencies “upend[s] ordinary principles of
interpretation.” Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (statement of Scalia, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari); see also Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722,
736 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Agencies, no less than courts, must honor the
rule of lenity.”). But Justice Scalia significantly understated the authority preferring
administrative interpretations to lenity. See Whitman, 135 U.S. at 353 (discussing only Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995), in support of
deference).
135. 531 U.S. 230 (2001).
136. Id. at 239–40.

95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

932

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95

refused to apply the rule of lenity at either step one or step two of
Chevron to limit the bureau’s discretion. Because “the statute cannot be
read to prohibit the Bureau from exercising its discretion categorically
or on the basis of preconviction conduct,” the Court wrote, the inmate’s
“reliance on the rule [of lenity] is unavailing.”137
In fact, the Supreme Court has treated even Skidmore deference as
precluding resort to the rule of lenity. Interpreting the anti-retaliation
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp.,138 the Court concluded that agency
interpretations of that provision as covering retaliation against oral as
well as written complaints were reasonable, longstanding, and
“consequently add force to our conclusion.”139 Only then did the Court
turn to lenity, which it rejected on the ground that, “after engaging in
traditional methods of statutory interpretation,” the statute was not
“sufficiently ambiguous to warrant application of the rule of lenity.”140
Some lower courts have allowed agency interpretations to foreclose
the application of other normative canons. The Ninth Circuit has held
“that the canon of liberal interpretation in favor of Native Americans
must give way to the Chevron rule that deference be accorded to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute,”141 though other circuits
have disagreed.142 The Federal Circuit has allowed Chevron to trump the

137. Id. at 244 n.7 (citing Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998)); see also United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (invoking rule of lenity only with respect to questions of interpretation not covered by
Chevron deference); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
704 n.18 (1995) (“We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard
for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute
authorizes criminal enforcement.”). For lower court decisions, see Oppedisano v. Holder, 769
F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014); Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 535 (4th Cir. 2005);
Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005); Amador-Palomares v. Ashcroft, 382
F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2004); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 2001).
138. 563 U.S. 1 (2011).
139. Id. at 14–16 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (other citations
omitted).
140. Id. In Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995), the Court also appears to have allowed
Skidmore deference to preclude application of the rule of lenity. See id. at 61, 65. The Court
did not specify the level of deference and cited Chevron, but it deferred to an agency
guideline, which would generally be treated under Skidmore. See id. at 61. As in Kasten, the
Court held that lenity would come into play only after other tools of interpretation had been
exhausted. See id. at 64–65 (“The rule of lenity applies only . . . ‘after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived[]’ . . . .” (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993))).
141. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States ex rel. Norton, 343 F.3d
1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997)).
142. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ramah Navajo Chapter v.
Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1997).
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rule of resolving interpretive doubts in favor of veterans in some cases143
and has allowed the rule favoring veterans to trump Chevron in at least
one other.144
The D.C. Circuit has more broadly questioned whether courts
should employ the normative canons even when evaluating the
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation at Chevron step two. In
Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh,145 the court
reasoned:
Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among
various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. If a statute is
ambiguous, a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency decision
merely because it failed to rely on any one of a number of canons
of construction that might have shaded the interpretation a few
degrees in one direction or another.146
How to balance “two legislative policies in tension,” the court reasoned,
was “precisely the paradigm situation Chevron addressed.”147
Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts should allow
agency interpretations to foreclose application of canons more generally.
“When the statutory text at hand is ambiguous or vague, judges should
defer to the interpretations of administrative agencies or executive
agents rather than attempting to fill in gaps or ambiguities by reference
to other sources,” he writes, including “many of the canons of
construction.”148 Like Bamberger, Vermeule argues that “[a]gencies will
often possess far better information about the legislative process that
produced the statute, about the specialized policy context surrounding
the statute’s enactment, and about the resulting legislative deal.”149 But
unlike Bamberger, Vermeule would not ask at Chevron step two

143. Nat’l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 809 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
144. Kirkendall v. Dep’t of Army, 479 F.3d 830, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
145. 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989)
(mem.).
146. Id. at 1292; see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If . . . the
statute is ambiguous, then Chevron step two ‘implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing
among various canons of construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations.’ ” (quoting
Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1292)).
147. Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1293. In another case, the D.C. Circuit held that normative
canons could not be used at step two even to show that the agency’s interpretation was
reasonable. See Ober United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 135 F.3d 822, 825
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
148. VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 183.
149. Id. at 209.
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whether the agency had sufficiently considered the normative canon or
its underlying values.150
Reasonable minds may differ about how the strengths of agency
decision making should affect the application of normative canons
within the Chevron framework. But it should at least be clear that there
is a range of possibilities. The Supreme Court has clearly held that some
normative canons apply at Chevron step one, that others apply at
Chevron step two, and that still others may not apply at all once an
agency has interpreted a statute. This Article now considers what the
Supreme Court has already said about where the presumption against
extraterritoriality falls within this range of possibilities.
III. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF DEFERENCE
This Part moves from canons in general to the presumption against
extraterritoriality in particular. Contrary to the assumptions of some
courts and commentators, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not
establish that the presumption is a tool of interpretation to be applied at
Chevron step one. Instead, these decisions suggest that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should be applied when a court considers the
reasonableness of an agency interpretation at Chevron step two.
A. Foley Bros. v. Filardo
The Supreme Court first considered the relationship between the
presumption against extraterritoriality and agency interpretations in
Foley Bros. v. Filardo.151 The interpretive question was whether the
federal Eight Hour Law mandating overtime pay applied to a contract
between the United States and a private contractor to perform
construction work in Iran and Iraq.152 The Court began with the
presumption against extraterritoriality—“that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”153 There was nothing in the
text or legislative history of the act, the Court concluded, to rebut this
presumption.154
150. Id. at 206 (“[J]udges should defer to agencies’ choices about whether, when, and how
to employ the traditional tools where a linguistic gap or ambiguity exists in the provision
immediately at hand.”).
151. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
152. 40 U.S.C. §§ 321–26 (1946); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 282–83.
153. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437
(1932)).
154. Id. at 285–88.
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But the Court went on to consider whether “administrative
interpretations of the Eight Hour Law” might provide a “touchstone by
which its geographic scope can be determined.”155 First, there was an
executive order suspending the law at U.S. military bases leased from
Great Britain, which indicated “a conclusion on the part of the President
that the statute applied, or might apply, to these bases.”156 But the order
did not speak to “the Act’s applicability to localities unquestionably and
completely beyond the direct legislative competence of the United
States.”157 There were also two attorney general’s opinions interpreting
the act.158 But they pointed in different directions, with the 1905 opinion
indicating that the law did apply to the construction of public works in
the Panama Canal Zone and the 1924 opinion indicating that the law did
not apply to English workers remodeling the U.S. Embassy in London.159
Finally, the Court noted that the Treasury Department did not require
use of its standard construction contract with an eight-hour provision in
foreign countries and that the State Department did not consider it
necessary to include such provisions in contracts to be performed in
foreign countries.160 In the end, the Court concluded “that administrative
interpretations of the Act, although not specifically directed at the
precise problem before us” tended to support a “restricted geographical
scope.”161
In Foley Bros., the presumption against extraterritoriality did not
make administrative interpretations of the Eight Hour Law irrelevant.
Foley Bros. was decided long before Chevron, but it came just five years
after Skidmore.162 Although Foley Bros. did not cite Skidmore, the Court
gave the administrative interpretations of the Eight Hour Law precisely
the kind of treatment one would have expected under Skidmore, looking
in each instance to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
155. Id. at 288.
156. Id.; Exec. Order No. 8623, 6 Fed. Reg. 13 (Dec. 31, 1940). The same was true of other
executive orders suspending operation of the act in other U.S. possessions. Foley Bros., 336
U.S. at 282–83.
157. Id. at 288–89.
158. Id. at 289.
159. Id.; see Eight Hour Law—Public Works Outside the Territorial Limits of the United
States, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 257 (1924); Eight Hour Law—Panama Canal, 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 441
(1905).
160. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 290.
161. Id.
162. Skidmore was decided in 1944, Foley Bros. in 1949, and Chevron in 1984. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at
281; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 134 (1944).
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persuade.”163 The fact that the question in Foley Bros. was one of
geographic scope, rather than some other interpretive question, did not
change the Court’s approach to administrative interpretations.
B.

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.

Chevron was decided in 1984. Four years later, in K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc.,164 the Supreme Court applied Chevron’s two-step
framework to evaluate an agency’s interpretations of a statute’s
geographic scope. To deal with the problem of gray-market goods,165
Congress passed Tariff Act § 526, prohibiting the importation of “any
merchandise of foreign manufacture” that bears a trademark owned by
a U.S. national.166 The Customs Service issued regulations creating two
exceptions to the prohibition: (1) a “common-control” exception,
permitting importation if the foreign and U.S. trademarks were owned
by the same person or by persons subject to common ownership or
control;167 and (2) an “authorized-use” exception, permitting
importation if the trademark was applied under authorization of the
U.S. owner.168 The Court splintered on the application of Chevron’s twostep analysis, but a majority agreed that Chevron provided the proper
framework.169 And although Justice Brennan did not invoke Chevron
directly,170 he similarly framed his analysis in terms of the ambiguity of
the statute and the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation.171
Applying Chevron’s two-step analysis to the common-control
exception, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice White) found the phrase
“foreign manufacture” to be ambiguous because it could refer to goods
made in a foreign country or to goods made by a foreign company and
held that the agency was therefore “entitled to choose any reasonable
definition and to interpret the statute to say that goods manufactured by

163. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 288–90.
164. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
165. As the Court explained, “[a] gray-market good is a foreign-manufactured good,
bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent of the United
States trademark holder.” Id. at 285.
166. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2012)).
167. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)–(2) (1987).
168. Id. § 133.21(c)(3).
169. Justice Kennedy set forth the Chevron framework in section II.A of his opinion, K
Mart, 486 U.S. at 291–92, which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice O’Connor joined, see id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170. Instead, Justice Brennan relied upon INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), a
subsequent case applying Chevron. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 300, 309 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445–49).
171. See infra notes 173–74, 178 and accompanying text.

95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

2017]

CHEVRON & EXTRATERRITORIALITY

937

a foreign subsidiary or division of a domestic company are not goods ‘of
foreign manufacture.’ ”172 Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens) agreed that “foreign manufacture” was ambiguous173 and
concluded that the Customs Service’s interpretation was “reasonable.”174
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun
and O’Connor), on the other hand, thought “of foreign manufacture”
could mean only “manufactured abroad” and so would have invalidated
the agency’s regulation at Chevron step one.175 The agency’s authorizeduse exception, on the other hand, did not survive Chevron step one.176 A
majority of the Court concluded that “[u]nder no reasonable
construction of the statutory language can goods made in a foreign
country by an independent foreign manufacturer be removed from the
purview of the statute.”177 Justice Brennan disagreed, but again in ways
that echoed Chevron.178
Thus, just four years after Chevron, the Supreme Court applied its
two-step analysis in the context of extraterritorial regulation. Moreover,
the Court specifically deferred to an agency on the geographic scope of a
statute, upholding its interpretation of the phrase “of foreign
manufacture” to exclude goods manufactured by a foreign affiliate of a
U.S. company.179 K Mart does not definitively settle the relationship
between Chevron and the presumption against extraterritoriality for two
reasons—first, because it predates the revival of the presumption in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.180 and EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co (“Aramco”);181 and, second, because the
phrase “of foreign manufacture” might have rebutted the presumption
even if the Court had thought the presumption applicable. But K Mart
does provide another example of the Supreme Court applying its
standard rules of deference to administrative agencies to questions of
geographic scope.

172. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 292–93 (Kennedy, J.).
173. See id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 309.
175. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 294 (majority opinion).
177. Id.; see also id. at 323 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Section
526(a) also unambiguously embraces . . . the situation . . . in which a domestic trademark
owner and registrant authorizes a foreign firm to use its United States trademark abroad.”).
178. Id. at 316 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Since I believe
that the application of § 526 to [authorized use] is ambiguous, the sole remaining question is
whether Treasury’s decision to exclude [authorized use] from § 526’s prohibition is entitled to
deference.”).
179. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
180. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
181. 499 U.S. 244 (1991); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.

The presumption against extraterritoriality was reborn in
Aramco.182 There, the Supreme Court relied on the presumption to
conclude that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,183 which prohibits
employment discrimination, did not apply to a U.S. company’s
employment of a U.S. citizen abroad.184
For present purposes, the important part of the Aramco Court’s
analysis is its treatment of the EEOC’s 1988 guideline construing Title
VII to apply extraterritorially.185 The Court concluded at Chevron step
zero that this guideline was not entitled to Chevron deference because
Congress had not given the EEOC authority to promulgate rules and
regulations for Title VII.186 The Court therefore evaluated the guideline
under Skidmore, finding that its “persuasive value is limited”187 because
the agency changed its position since Title VII’s enactment but
“offer[ed] no basis in its experience for the change.”188 Given the limited
persuasive value of the guideline under Skidmore, the Court concluded,
“the EEOC’s interpretation is insufficiently weighty to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”189
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion specifically on the issue of
deference. He questioned the Court’s conclusion that the EEOC’s views
were “not entitled to the deference normally accorded administrative
agencies under Chevron.”190 Instead, Justice Scalia would have rejected
the EEOC’s interpretation as unreasonable at Chevron step two:
[D]eference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only
those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the
principles of construction courts normally employ. Given the
presumption against extraterritoriality that the Court accurately
describes, and the requirement that the intent to overcome it be
“clearly expressed,” it is in my view not reasonable to give effect
to mere implications from the statutory language as the EEOC
182. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
183. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17).
184. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
185. See id. at 257–58.
186. See id. at 257.
187. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 257; cf. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (noting that a
“[s]udden and unexplained change . . . may be ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’ ” (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)) (citations omitted)).
189. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
190. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Justice Scalia
characterized the question as “unsettled.” Id. at 260.
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has done. Cf. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2114 (1990).191
It is notable that both the Court and Justice Scalia viewed questions
of geographic scope as subject to the normal rules of deference to
administrative agencies under Skidmore and Chevron. The Court
concluded at step zero that the EEOC’s interpretation was not entitled
to Chevron deference because the EEOC had not been delegated
authority to issue interpretations with the force of law.192 The Court also
found that the EEOC’s interpretation was not persuasive under
Skidmore.193 But in concluding that this particular interpretation was
“insufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption against
extraterritorial application,”194 the Court left open the possibility that
another agency interpretation—even one entitled only to Skidmore
deference—might be sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption.
Justice Scalia also thought that the normal rules of deference to
administrative agencies applied to questions of geographic scope. He
would have rejected the EEOC’s interpretation at Chevron step two on
the ground that it was not “reasonable in light of the principles of
construction courts normally employ,” specifically the presumption
against extraterritoriality.195 However, he left open the possibility of
deference to an agency interpretation that took the presumption against
extraterritoriality into account.
Notably, neither the Court nor Justice Scalia took the position in
Aramco that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be
applied at Chevron step one to remove all ambiguity and leave nothing
for the agency to decide, as Cass Sunstein had done in the 1990 article
that Justice Scalia cited.196 The fact that Sunstein put the step-one option
on the table makes the decisions of both the Court and Justice Scalia not
to endorse that option all the more striking.197

191. Id. at 260.
192. See id. at 257 (majority opinion).
193. Id. at 258.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
196. Sunstein later changed his position. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1204; see
also supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
197. Note that Justice Scalia cited Sunstein using a “cf.” signal, which means that the cited
authority supports a proposition different from, but analogous to, the text proposition. See
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see
also THE SUPREME COURT’S STYLE GUIDE § 11.2(d) (Jack Metzler ed., 2016).
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D. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,198 the Supreme Court
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to § 10(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act.199 The Court rejected the conduct and effects
tests developed by the lower courts.200 Instead, it adopted a
“transactional test,”201 holding that § 10(b) reaches fraud “only in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American
stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the
United States.”202
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Morrison and, near the end of
his opinion, he returned to the question of deference to agency
interpretations that had prompted his concurrence in Aramco. Section
10(b) expressly gives the SEC authority to prescribe rules.203 SEC Rule
10b-5 implementing this provision had not interpreted its geographic
scope,204 but the SEC had adopted the lower courts’ conduct and effects
tests in adjudications under the Exchange Act.205 As a general matter,
SEC adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference,206 and the U.S.
Solicitor General argued that the Court should defer to the SEC’s
interpretation of § 10(b)’s geographic scope in those adjudications.207
The Court declined to defer for two reasons. First, at Chevron step
zero, Justice Scalia noted that “the Commission did not purport to be
providing its own interpretation of the statute, but relied on decisions of
federal courts.”208 This treatment of the SEC’s interpretation echoed the
Court’s decision the previous Term in Negusie v. Holder, which rejected
a Board of Immigration Appeals interpretation because the BIA had

198. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . or any securities-based swap agreement any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”).
200. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256–61 (reviewing lower court decisions).
201. Id. at 269.
202. Id. at 273.
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (making it unlawful “[t]o use . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”).
204. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
205. See In re U.S. Sec. Clearing Corp., 52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14, 96 n.16 (1994); In re Robert
F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 78 n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975).
206. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002).
207. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272.
208. Id. (citing In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket
75, 78 n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975)).
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mistakenly thought its hands tied by a prior judicial decision and thus
“ha[d] not exercised its interpretive authority.”209
Alternatively, Justice Scalia concluded that the SEC’s
interpretation was not reasonable at Chevron step two, quoting his own
concurring opinion in Aramco.210 Because the SEC’s decisions had
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia
concluded, “we owe them no deference.”211 As with Aramco, Scalia’s
treatment of Chevron deference is significant for what it does not do—
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one to
determine that the intent of Congress is clear.212 It leaves open the
possibility that an agency decision exercising the authority delegated by
Congress to interpret the geographic scope of a statute it administers
would be entitled to Chevron deference, at least if the agency considered
(rather than ignored) the presumption against extraterritoriality.
That possibility is confirmed by Morrison’s discussion in two other
places. First, in considering whether there was sufficient evidence in the
Securities Exchange Act to rebut the presumption, Justice Scalia
discussed with approval § 30(a) of that act, which makes it unlawful for
brokers and dealers to carry out any transaction “on an exchange not
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” in the
securities of a U.S. issuer “in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe.”213 Scalia lauded this section for
“contain[ing] what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial
effect.”214 It is true, of course, that § 30(a) contains language that would
rebut the presumption.215 But it is also true that § 30(a) expressly

209. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522 (2009).
210. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272 (“We need ‘accept only those agency interpretations that
are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ.’ ” (quoting
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment))).
211. Id. at 272–73.
212. Justice Scalia has been critical of expanding step one. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 453–54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the implication
“that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever,
‘[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,’ they are able to reach a conclusion as
to the proper interpretation of the statute” as “an evisceration of Chevron” (alteration in
original) (quoting majority opinion)); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (“If Chevron is to have any meaning, then,
congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not just when no interpretation is even
marginally better than any other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not
necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist.”).
213. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2012)).
214. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2012) (referring to exchanges “not within or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States”).
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delegates to the SEC the authority to regulate extraterritoriality.216 If an
express delegation of such authority is permissible, then an implicit
delegation should be as well, for it is one of the teachings of Chevron
that Congress may delegate regulatory authority implicitly as well as
expressly.217
Second, and perhaps more significantly, in discussing the focus of
§ 10(b), Justice Scalia did rely on a different SEC interpretation of
geographic scope. This interpretation, known as Regulation S, construes
the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act “not to
include . . . sales that occur outside the United States.”218 Scalia used this
regulation to show that “[t]he same focus on domestic transactions is
evident in the Securities Act” as in the Exchange Act.219 Of course,
Regulation S would only be relevant to show the focus of the Securities
Act if it were entitled to deference as the reasonable interpretation of an
agency charged with the administration of the act.
In short, not only did Morrison avoid holding that the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies at Chevron step one to remove
ambiguities from the statute, it endorsed the notion that Congress may
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to regulate
extraterritorially, and it actually deferred to an agency regulation
defining the geographic scope of a statutory provision.
* * *
What may one conclude from what the Supreme Court has already
said about deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope?
First, and most broadly, questions of geographic scope are treated no
differently from other questions of interpretation. The Court applied the
normal rules of Chevron deference in K Mart, Aramco, and Morrison,
concluding that deference was due in the first case and not in the other
two.220 The Court also applied the normal rules of Skidmore deference in
Foley Bros. and Aramco, suggesting in each case that even Skidmore
deference might be sufficient to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.221
Second, courts are not to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality at Chevron step one to remove any ambiguity about

216. See id. (prohibiting actions “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe”).
217. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
218. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2016)). For further discussion
of Regulation S, see infra Section V.C.2.
219. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 268 (citation omitted).
220. See supra notes 172–74, 186, 208–11 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 155–63, 187–89 and accompanying text.

95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017)

2017]

CHEVRON & EXTRATERRITORIALITY

943

geographic scope and leave no discretion to the agency. The Supreme
Court has certainly concluded that an agency’s interpretation was not
entitled to Chevron deference at step zero—in Aramco because the
agency lacked the authority to make binding interpretations222 and in
Morrison because it had not exercised that authority.223 The Supreme
Court has also suggested in Morrison that an agency’s interpretation
might not be reasonable if it did not take the presumption against
extraterritoriality into account. But the Court has never applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one, despite
having opportunities to do so in both Aramco and Morrison.
Third, the Supreme Court does sometimes defer to agency
interpretations of a statutory provision’s geographic scope. It did so in K
Mart, before the revival of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
holding that the agency’s interpretation of the phrase “of foreign
manufacture” was reasonable.224 And it did so again in Morrison when it
leaned on the SEC’s Regulation S to show that the focus of the
Securities Act was on domestic transactions.225 Part IV considers
whether deferring to agency determinations of geographic scope is
warranted.
IV. THE CASE FOR STEP TWO
As Part III has shown, the Supreme Court has not treated the
presumption against extraterritoriality as a normative canon to be
applied at Chevron step one. If Congress has delegated interpretive
authority to an agency and if the agency has exercised that authority, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the presumption should be applied at
Chevron step two, with courts deferring to reasonable agency
interpretations of geographic scope and overturning unreasonable
ones.226 If Congress has not delegated interpretive authority or if the
agency has not exercised that authority, the Supreme Court has further
suggested that agency interpretations of geographic scope are entitled to
Skidmore deference based on their power to persuade.227

222. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
226. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010) (“We need ‘accept only
those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction
courts normally employ.’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))).
227. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991) (majority
opinion); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 288–90 (1990).
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This Part asks whether such treatment makes sense. Section IV.A
first considers the strengths of agency interpretation in comparison to
courts. Agencies are likely to have a better understanding than courts of
statutory purposes, regulatory options, and potential conflicts with
foreign interests. Agencies can also calibrate extraterritorial regulation
far better than courts, maximizing the achievement of statutory purposes
while minimizing conflicts with foreign interests. Then, Section IV.B
considers the proper role of courts. It distinguishes the presumption
against extraterritoriality from the normative canons that are applied at
Chevron step one, but it also rejects complete deference. Section IV.B
concludes that having courts review agency interpretations of
geographic scope for reasonableness at Chevron step two is the best way
to ensure that agencies actually bring their interpretive strengths to bear
when they regulate extraterritorially.
A. The Strengths of Agency Interpretation
At bottom, the presumption against extraterritoriality serves to
balance statutory purposes against potential conflicts with foreign
interests.228 Agencies possess advantages in weighing both. In
understanding the purposes of statutory provisions, agencies have access
to information that goes beyond the text and legislative history to which
courts generally are limited. Agencies also have a better understanding
of the full range of regulatory options available to achieve those
statutory purposes. In evaluating potential conflicts with foreign
interests, agencies may take advantage of their contacts with foreign
regulators, while courts consider the possibilities of conflict only in the
abstract. Not only are agencies better at evaluating both sides of the
equation, they also have the capacity to strike a more finely calibrated
balance between them. This Section describes agency advantages with
respect to statutory purposes, regulatory options, potential conflicts with
foreign interests, and calibration in turn.
Statutory purposes are central to both steps of the framework that
the Supreme Court has developed for courts to apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Courts must look for a clear indication of
congressional intent to regulate extraterritorially at RJR step one and
must determine the focus of congressional concern at RJR step two.229
But as Professor Kevin Stack has noted, “[a]gencies are far better

228. See supra Section I.B.
229. See supra notes 62–81 and accompanying text.
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positioned than courts to discern statutory purposes.”230 The evidence to
which courts look for a clear indication of extraterritoriality at step
one—text, context, structure, legislative history—is equally available to
agencies. Agencies also seem capable of performing step two’s focus
analysis at least as well as courts.231 Certainly, Morrison expressed
confidence that agencies could perform this sort of focus analysis when it
relied on the SEC’s Regulation S as evidence that the focus of the
Securities Act, like the Exchange Act, was on domestic transactions.232
In construing the geographic scope of a statutory provision,
however, agencies have access to additional information about statutory
purposes that courts lack, including “information about the legislative
process that produced the statute, about the specialized policy context
surrounding the statute’s enactment, and about the resulting legislative
deal.”233 As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, this makes agencies
better readers of legislative history, able to distinguish “the legislative
history wheat, from the more manipulative chaff.”234 Furthermore,
agencies continue to receive information about Congress’s preferences
after a statute is passed “through both formal means such as agency
budgets, oversight hearings, and official confirmation decisions, and
through informal means, such as frequent contact with legislators and
staff.”235 In Chevron, the Supreme Court noted that it had consistently
230. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret
Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 906 (2015).
231. See id. at 907 (“To the extent statutory purpose is discernible from statutory text
(including enacted statements of purpose), agencies and courts have equal access to it, and
agencies have the advantage of having more than sporadic encounters with the statutes they
administer.”).
232. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268–69 (2010); see also supra notes
218–19 and accompanying text.
233. VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 209. This is particularly true when an agency has
participated extensively in the drafting process. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of
Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129 (2015) (“If the executive is involved in drafting
legislation, then it will have special insight into what the goals and intentions behind the
legislation actually were, what the political and practical compromises were, and how
[members of Congress] thought about specific problems throughout the legislative process.”).
234. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
321, 347 (1990); see also Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 999, 1043 (2015) (reporting that agencies distinguish among different kinds of
legislative history when interpreting statutes).
235. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 98 (footnotes omitted); see also Jerry L. Mashaw,
Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 512 (2005) (“Agencies are subjected to legislative
oversight of their implementing activity. They consult with Congress continuously about
proposals relevant to their jurisdictions. They appear before congressional appropriations
committees who often have strong views about the directions that agency implementation
should take.”).
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deferred to administrative interpretations “whenever decision as to the
meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in
the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.”236 That
description clearly fits many instances of extraterritorial regulation.
Agencies also have better knowledge of the range of regulatory
possibilities and how each of those possibilities might serve the statutory
policy.237 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has given Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope in a domestic
context.238 Agencies can also use notice-and-comment rulemaking to
obtain “input from a wide variety of sources in a way that can facilitate
transparent policymaking and reasoned deliberation about the
consequences of proposed policies.”239 As Professor Kenneth
Bamberger has summarized, “agencies are more likely than courts to
possess the resources needed to engage in interest balancing and to
assess the practical impact of normative policy choices.”240
Agencies that regulate internationally are generally in contact with
their counterparts in other countries.241 As a result, these agencies are
likely to have far better information than courts about the extent to
which each regulatory option might conflict with the interests of other
countries and the amount of discord such conflict would cause. Courts,
by contrast, consider the possibility of conflict with foreign interests only
in the abstract. Although preventing “unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international

236. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
237. See Stack, supra note 230, at 908 (“Agencies are also better equipped than courts at
selecting the best means of implementation.”).
238. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (“In
view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the
inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological
judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an
adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under
the Act.”).
239. Stack, supra note 230, at 909.
240. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 67.
241. See Administrative Conference of the United States: Adoption of Recommendations,
77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2016) (highlighting international “coordination in regulatory
promulgation, mutual recognition of inspection and certification regimes, and coordination
and information sharing in enforcement” by agencies). In 2012, President Obama issued
Executive Order 13,609 to promote international regulatory cooperation. Exec. Order No.
13,609, 3 C.F.R. § 13609 (2012); see also David Zaring, Free Trade Through Regulation?, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 863, 881–86 (2016) (discussing examples of regulatory cooperation under
Executive Order 13,609).
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discord” is often cited as one of the reasons for the presumption,242 the
Supreme Court has never required a showing of actual conflict with
foreign law.243
Finally, agencies are able to calibrate the geographic scope of their
regulations in far finer detail than courts. Noting the complexities of
regulating employment discrimination abroad in Aramco, the Supreme
Court observed that Congress could “amend Title VII and in doing so
will be able to calibrate its provisions in a way that we cannot.”244
Congress did, in fact, amend Title VII to specify its application to U.S.
companies and to foreign companies controlled by U.S. companies in
their employment of U.S. citizens abroad and also to create an exception
for discrimination required by foreign law.245 But the EEOC has in turn
issued guidance on the interpretation of these provisions that explains
their application in greater detail.246 The regulations discussed in Section
V.C—HSR, Regulation S, and the Volcker Rule—provide further
examples of calibration that no court would have attempted as a matter
of statutory interpretation. Such fine-tuning allows agencies to maximize
the achievement of statutory purposes while minimizing conflicts with
foreign interests.247 As Professor Peter Strauss has written, “agencies
read their particular statutes with a far richer understanding of context,
interrelationship, and impact than courts could hope to achieve.”248
While generally arguing for Chevron deference on questions of
geographic scope, Professor Curtis Bradley has questioned whether such
deference is appropriate for agencies that lack foreign affairs expertise
and for independent agencies not subject to direct presidential control.249
But there are good reasons to reject such a qualification. First, many
242. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondoras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)); see
also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (noting that
presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is
applied to conduct in foreign countries” (citations omitted)).
243. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly said that the presumption applies “regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.” RJR
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255
(2010)).
244. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
245. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1(b)–(c) (2012).
246. See Enforcement Guidance on Application of Title VII and the Americans with
Disabilities Act to Conduct Overseas and to Foreign Employers Discriminating in the United
States, EEOC (Oct. 20, 1993), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extratesrritorial-vii-ada.html
[https://perma.cc/NKF5-DDE9].
247. Detailed regulations on geographic scope have the further advantage of providing
clear guidance to regulated parties of what is covered by a statutory provision and what is not.
248. Strauss, supra note 234, at 352.
249. Bradley, supra note 21, at 694–95.
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agencies other than the State Department (including independent
agencies) do have foreign affairs expertise with respect to the specific
questions that fall within their areas of responsibility.250 Second, as
Professor Jody Freeman and Professor Jim Rossi have shown, many
tools exist to coordinate rule making among different agencies.251 The
joint rule making with respect to the Volcker Rule shows that such
coordination can occur even when independent agencies are involved.252
Third, to the extent coordination with the United States Department of
State or another government agency with expertise in foreign affairs is
necessary to make an agency’s interpretation of geographic scope
reasonable, courts may take such coordination (or the lack thereof) into
account at Chevron step two.253 In short, the arguments for Chevron
deference on questions of geographic scope are not limited to agencies
with foreign affairs expertise or to those subject to the direct control of
the President.
B.

The Proper Role of Courts

If there is much to be gained by allowing agencies to interpret the
geographic scope of the statutes they administer, is there anything to be
lost by limiting the role of courts? Are agencies capable of protecting
the normative values reflected in the presumption against
extraterritoriality as effectively as courts? After all, the Supreme Court
has held that a number of normative canons should be applied at
Chevron step one.254
It may be instructive to compare the presumption against
extraterritoriality to some step-one normative canons, like the
constitutional avoidance canon, the canon against encroaching on
traditional state powers, and the canon against retroactivity. Each of
these step-one canons reflects normative values that are constitutionally
based. The underlying assumption appears to be that courts are better
than agencies at protecting such values. The presumption against
extraterritoriality, by contrast, is “not founded on constitutional or other

250. Administrative Conference of the United States: Adoption of Recommendations, 77
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2016) (“Many agencies successfully engage in international
cooperation through a variety of different methods.”).
251. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1155–81 (2012).
252. See infra Section V.C.3 (discussing Volcker Rule).
253. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (declining to defer to an agency’s
foreign policy rationale because it had not consulted with the State Department, to which
Congress has specifically delegated the formulation of policy).
254. See supra Section II.A.
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concerns that suggest a need for congressional as opposed to Executive
resolution.”255
Among the other normative canons, the closest analogue to the
presumption against extraterritoriality appears to be the presumption
against preemption.256 It too requires weighing a federal statutory
purpose against the possibility of conflict with the laws of other
sovereigns. Although the case law is somewhat muddled, the Supreme
Court has generally treated the presumption against preemption at
Chevron step two.257 But the case for applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality at step two is significantly stronger than the case for
applying the presumption against preemption there. Some have argued
that courts are better equipped to protect state sovereignty within a
federal system than administrative agencies.258 But there is little reason
to think that the same is true with respect to the interests of other
countries. As others have noted, “the executive branch has much greater
expertise and access to information than the courts concerning foreign
affairs matters.”259 Many federal agencies are in close touch with their
foreign counterparts,260 and one in particular—the Department of
State—has a strong interest in avoiding unnecessary conflicts with
foreign interests.
To suggest that administrative agencies are capable of protecting
the interests of other countries is not to say that their interpretations of
geographic scope will necessarily be more constrained than those of
courts applying the presumption against extraterritoriality. When
achieving statutory purposes requires extraterritorial regulation and
when conflicts with foreign interests are weak, one may expect agencies
to interpret the geographic scope of statutory provisions broadly. What
one can expect is that agencies will seek to avoid unnecessary conflicts

255. Bradley, supra note 21, at 694; see also Clopton, supra note 21, at 43 (“The
presumption against extraterritoriality has a different origin—it is not a constitutionally
inspired rule, but instead it is a rule designed to promote policy goals and to approximate
legislative intent.”).
256. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Section II.B.
258. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 742 (2004)
(“An agency may expertly assess the extent to which a particular state statute interferes with
the achievement of a federal goal. Other institutions, however, may better assess issues such
as the overall distribution of governmental authority and the intrinsic value of preserving core
state regulatory authority.”).
259. Bradley, supra note 21, at 664; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1207
(noting that “the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the foreign
relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting”).
260. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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and that they will have a better understanding than courts of when
conflict is necessary and when it is not.
If agencies can protect the normative values reflected in the
presumption against extraterritoriality, would it make sense to defer
completely to their interpretations of geographic scope, foreclosing any
application of the presumption? This is what the Supreme Court has
done with the rule of lenity,261 and it is what Professor Adrian Vermeule
has suggested for canons of interpretation more generally.262 This Article
rejects complete deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope
for two reasons. First, reviewing the reasonableness of an agency’s
extraterritorial regulation at Chevron step two can ensure that the
agency has not completely ignored the normative values reflected in the
presumption.263 It provides a backstop to protect against the rare
instance in which an agency has interpreted the geographic scope of a
statute with no regard for foreign interests. Second, the prospect of
reasonableness review “can alter administrative behavior
prospectively,”264 giving agencies greater incentives to take comity
values seriously in the first place. Recent empirical work suggests that
judicial review does influence the rule-drafting process and that agencies
take greater account of canons that courts in fact apply.265 In summary,
as Professor Kenneth Bamberger has written, “the reasonableness
analysis provides both incentives for administrative accommodation of
the underlying value in the first instance and the opportunity for
meaningful judicial review.”266
Of course, judicial review might take a number of different forms.
Judicial review should provide appropriate incentives to agencies and
guard against rogue interpretations. It should also take advantage of
agency strengths and avoid substituting the court’s judgment for the
agency’s. Part V focuses on the form that reasonableness review should
take at Chevron step two.

261. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
262. See VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 183.
263. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 493–94
(2014) (“As a check on executive power, hard look review prevents arbitrary and capricious
actions, actions unsupported by logical reasoning or evidence, and actions that violate
procedures or fail to consider relevant alternatives.”).
264. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 118.
265. See Walker, supra note 234, at 1052 (“The overwhelming majority of rule drafters
surveyed recognized that judicial review plays a role in their interpretive efforts and that
judicial views on the various interpretive tools influence their rule-drafting process. For
instance, nearly four in five rule drafters indicated that it matters to their rule-drafting
practices whether courts routinely rely on the canons.”).
266. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 121.
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V. THE PRESUMPTION AT STEP TWO
If the presumption against extraterritoriality is best applied at
Chevron step two, the question then becomes just how review at step
two should operate. Must an agency track what a court would do under
the presumption for its interpretation to be considered reasonable? Or
should it be sufficient for an agency to consider the normative values
that underlie the presumption?
As a preliminary matter, Section V.A considers and rejects the
argument that the step-two analysis should vary depending on what the
statute says about its geographic scope. Chevron itself rejected the
distinction between explicit and implicit delegations of interpretive
authority.267 On the one hand, this means that Congress should not have
to say expressly that an agency may regulate extraterritorially. On the
other hand, it means that agency interpretations of geographic scope
should still be evaluated for reasonableness, even if the statute rebuts
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Section V.B outlines four possible models for applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step two. Under the
first model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable
only if the agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in
essentially the same way that a court would. Under the second model, a
court would defer to the agency with respect to certain inputs into the
extraterritoriality analysis, such as the focus of a statutory provision, but
not on the ultimate question of geographic scope. Under the third
model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable if the
agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, even if its
application differs from what the court would have done. Under the
fourth model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable
if it considered the normative values reflected in the presumption, even
if the agency did not apply the presumption itself.
Finally, Section V.C considers three significant administrative
interpretations of geographic scope: (1) the Federal Trade Commission’s
(“FTC’s”) interpretation of HSR in its “foreign commerce” exemptions;
(2) the SEC’s interpretation of the Securities Act’s registration
requirements in Regulation S; and (3) the joint agency interpretation of
the Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volcker Rule” in the recent regulations

267. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citations
omitted)).
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implementing that rule. This Section argues that each is reasonable and
should be given deference at Chevron step two, even though each likely
differs from the geographic scope that a court would have given these
statutory provisions.
A. The Form of Delegation Should Not Matter
Before considering how a court might evaluate the reasonableness
of an agency’s interpretation of a statute’s geographic scope, it is worth
considering whether the form of Congress’s delegation to the agency
should make a difference. At least three cases are worth considering:
(1) Congress might expressly delegate authority to an agency to
determine the geographic scope of a statute or to regulate
extraterritorially; (2) Congress might clearly indicate that a statute
applies extraterritorially while saying nothing expressly about the
agency’s authority to define the statute’s geographic scope; and
(3) Congress might say nothing expressly about either the statute’s
geographic scope or the agency’s authority to interpret that scope.
As an example of the first case, consider § 30(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful for brokers and dealers to
effectuate “on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States” transactions in the securities of U.S. issuers “in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this chapter.”268 One
might consider this to be the strongest case for deference on two
grounds. First, the express delegation shows that Congress wanted the
agency to have extraterritorial regulatory authority. Professor Cass
Sunstein has argued that nondelegation canons should prohibit only
implicit delegations and “should not be taken to forbid Congress from
delegating expressly if it chooses.”269 Thus, even if one considered the
presumption to be a nondelegation canon, as Sunstein did when he
wrote his article,270 it should not prevent Congress from adopting a
provision like § 30(a). Second, the delegation of extraterritorial
regulatory authority might itself be sufficient to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality. That is what Justice Scalia concluded in
Morrison when he wrote that “Subsection 30(a) contains what § 10(b)
lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect.”271 Once the
268. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2012).
269. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 336.
270. On Sunstein’s changed thinking with respect to the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
271. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
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presumption has been rebutted, one might argue that the presumption
against extraterritoriality simply falls away.272
The second case is a provision that rebuts the presumption against
extraterritoriality but does not expressly give the agency authority to
define the provision’s geographic scope. An example is the Volcker
Rule, discussed below,273 which prohibits banks from proprietary
trading. The Volcker Rule’s exception allowing foreign banks to engage
in such trading “solely outside of the United States,”274 almost certainly
gives the “clear indication of extraterritoriality” that the presumption
requires.275 On the other hand, in contrast to § 30(a) of the Exchange
Act, the Volcker Rule does not contain an express delegation to the
agencies with respect to geographic scope, only a more general
delegation to “adopt rules to carry out this section.”276 Under Chevron,
however, this should make no difference. As the Supreme Court has
recently made clear, for an agency interpretation to be entitled to
deference, a court need not find that “the particular issue was committed
to agency discretion.”277 It suffices that Congress has vested the agency
“with general authority to administer [a statute] through rulemaking and
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.”278
The third case is a provision that says nothing expressly either
about its geographic scope or about an agency’s authority to interpret
that scope. This describes most statutory schemes with potential
extraterritorial application, from HSR and the registration requirements
of the Securities Act (both considered below in Section V.C) to § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act (which the Court considered in
Morrison).279 Statutes in this third category should be treated just like
the other two. One of Chevron’s central teachings is that implicit
delegations of regulatory authority should not be treated differently
272. But see infra text following note 284 (arguing that courts should require agencies to
consider comity even if the presumption does not apply or has been rebutted).
273. See infra Section IV.C.3.
274. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012).
275. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.
276. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(A).
277. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
278. Id. Geographic scope is not the sort of major question that Congress cannot be
presumed to have delegated to agencies implicitly. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (holding that the regulation of tobacco was “a decision of
such economic and political significance” that Congress could not have intended to delegate it
to the FDA implicitly). Questions of geographic scope are common and vary in their
economic and political significance. Moreover, as Part IV has argued, agencies are in a better
position than courts to weigh the significance of extraterritorial regulation.
279. See infra Section VI.B.
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from explicit ones: “Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”280
As earlier discussion has shown, even in cases of implicit delegation
there are good reasons to prefer that agencies define the geographic
scope of statutory provisions rather than courts.281
Finally, it is worth adding that the clear indication of
extraterritoriality—present in the first two cases, but not in the third—
does not make the presumption irrelevant to judging whether an
agency’s interpretation of the provision’s geographic scope is
reasonable. In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court said that if the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted, “[t]he scope of
an extraterritorial statute . . . turns on the limits Congress has (or has
not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application.”282 It goes without
saying that an agency may not depart from the unambiguous intent of
Congress.283 But sometimes the limits that Congress has imposed will
require interpretation—like “solely outside of the United States” in the
Volcker Rule.284 An agency’s interpretation of such limits must be
reasonable to be entitled to deference under Chevron, and the values
reflected in the presumption are relevant to judging the reasonableness
of the agency’s interpretation. Even if Congress has clearly indicated
that a provision applies extraterritorially and imposed no express limits,
it should not be understood to have precluded agencies from doing so
unless such an intention is unambiguous. The normative values reflected
in the presumption against extraterritoriality—the need to weigh the
statutory purpose against international comity—do not evaporate simply
because Congress indicates that a provision has extraterritorial
application. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not an on-off
switch.
In sum, the form in which Congress delegates interpretive authority
to an agency should make no difference. The express delegation of
extraterritorial regulatory authority that distinguishes case one from

280. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (citations
omitted).
281. See supra Part IV.
282. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). RJR Nabisco
involved no question of deference to administrative agencies.
283. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. This is simply Chevron step one. See supra notes 37–39
and accompanying text (describing step one).
284. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012); see infra Section V.C.3.
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cases two and three makes no difference under City of Arlington.285 And
the clear indication of extraterritoriality that distinguishes cases one and
two from case three does not make the presumption against
extraterritoriality irrelevant.286 No matter what form the delegation
takes, agencies should be deemed to have the same interpretive
authority to decide questions of geographic scope as to decide other
issues. Moreover, regardless of whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted, the normative values reflected in
the presumption are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of agency
interpretations.
B.

Four Models for Evaluating Reasonableness

How should the presumption against extraterritoriality be
incorporated into Chevron step two? At the outset, it is worth recalling
what the Supreme Court said about this question in Morrison: “We need
‘accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of
the principles of construction courts normally employ.’ Since the
Commission’s interpretations relied on cases we disapprove, which
ignored or discarded the presumption against extraterritoriality, we owe
them no deference.”287 This passage might be read strictly to suggest that
agencies must apply the presumption exactly the way that courts would
in order to be entitled to deference. But it might also be read more
generously to foreclose deference only when the presumption had been
“ignored or discarded,”288 a standard that would not necessarily require
an agency to apply the presumption in the same way that a court would.
It is also worth noting that what the Court said here was dictum—it had
already rejected deference at Chevron step zero because “the
Commission did not purport to be providing its own interpretation of
the statute.”289 Thus, this passage from Morrison does not foreclose
other possibilities.
Although there is a range of possibilities for incorporating the
presumption against extraterritoriality into Chevron step two, four
models seem particularly worth discussing. Under the first model, a
court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable only if the

285. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013); see also supra notes 48–49 and
accompanying text.
286. See supra text following note 284.
287. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272–73 (2010) (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
288. Id. at 272.
289. Id.; see supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
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agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in essentially
the same way that a court would. It is possible to read Morrison’s dictum
this way.290 Indeed, two lower courts have suggested that agency
interpretations of geographic scope should be entitled to Chevron or
Skidmore deference only if the agency could point to evidence rebutting
the presumption in the statute itself.291 The problem with this approach
is that it turns Chevron step two into a version of Chevron step one. If a
court is going to insist that an agency interpret a statute exactly the way
the court would, then the court might as well go ahead and interpret the
statute itself. “If Chevron is to have any meaning,” Justice Scalia once
cautioned, “congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not
just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any other, but
rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally
valid, interpretations exist.”292 There are good reasons not to apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one,293 and those
same reasons counsel against requiring agencies to apply the
presumption exactly as courts would in order to be judged reasonable at
step two.
A second model would have courts defer to agencies with respect to
certain inputs into the extraterritoriality analysis, such as the focus of a
statutory provision, but not on the ultimate question of geographic
scope. In Wyeth v. Levine,294 a preemption case involving Skidmore
deference, the Supreme Court said it might give “ ‘some weight’ to an
agency’s views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives,” but
that it would not defer “to an agency’s conclusion that state law is preempted.”295 A similar approach to the presumption against
extraterritoriality might allow a court to defer at the second step of its
framework to an agency’s determination of a provision’s focus296 but
would reserve the question of whether application of the provision was
domestic or extraterritorial to the court. This model would be an
improvement over the first because it would harness agency strengths in
290. See supra text following note 287.
291. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is far from
clear that an agency’s assertion that a statute has extraterritorial effect, unmoored from any
plausible statutory basis for rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, should be
given [Chevron] deference.”); Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Because the Director cites no textual evidence of Congress’s clear intention to
authorize the extraterritorial application of the Act, the Director’s interpretation lacks
persuasive force [under Skidmore].”).
292. Scalia, supra note 212, at 520.
293. See supra Section IV.A.
294. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
295. Id. at 576 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 429 U.S. 861, 833 (2000)).
296. See supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
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determining statutory purposes, but this second model still fails to take
advantage of a significant amount of agency expertise. While it is true
that agencies would be at least as good as courts at determining a
provision’s focus for purposes of the presumption,297 their real strength
lies in evaluating different regulatory possibilities and making the
tradeoff between statutory purpose and international comity.298 Because
this approach leaves the ultimate question of extraterritoriality to the
court, it fails to harness those agency strengths.
Under a third model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation
reasonable even if the agency’s application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality differed from what the court would have done. In
other words, the court would defer so long as the agency had not
“ignored or discarded” the presumption.299 As Professor Kenneth
Bamberger notes approvingly, “agencies might arrive at conclusions that
would depart from independent judicial canon application.”300 The real
question is whether courts should require agencies to use the same twostep framework that courts use for the presumption against
extraterritoriality,301 even if courts defer to agencies with respect to
outcomes. In my view, this would be unduly constraining. The
presumption’s two-step framework was developed for courts, not
agencies. It simplifies questions of geographic scope for courts that lack
an agency’s expertise, ability to balance different values, and authority
to regulate in fine detail. But forcing agencies to act like courts prevents
them from bringing all of their advantages to bear.
Under the fourth model, a court would find the agency’s
interpretation reasonable if it considered the normative values reflected
in the presumption, even if the agency did not apply the presumption
itself. As Bamberger puts it, “courts should determine whether an
agency policy sufficiently reflects the background norm.”302 If so, it
should uphold the agency’s interpretation as reasonable. If not, the court
should “essentially ‘remand’ the issue to the agency to exercise (or not)

297. See supra notes 229–36 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 237–48 and accompanying text.
299. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010); see also Validus
Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“To accord
deference requires some indication that the agency has considered the effect of the
presumption against extraterritoriality . . . .”).
300. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 120; see also Mashaw, supra note 235, at 521 (“[I]t seems
fair to conclude that judges and administrators interpret—indeed should interpret—within
divergent normative contexts.”).
301. See supra Section I.B.
302. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 68.
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whatever statutory discretion remain[s].”303 This model allows agencies
to make full use of their strengths. They can assess the strength of the
statutory policy reflected in the provision, review the range of regulatory
options for effectuating that policy, evaluate the conflict with foreign
interests that each option would create, consider the amount of
international discord that would be caused by such conflicts, and finally
adopt a fine-grained regulation to carry out the statutory policy while
accommodating the interests of other countries to the greatest extent
possible.
Of these four models for evaluating whether an agency’s
interpretation of geographic scope is reasonable, the fourth is clearly
superior. The first model harnesses none of an agency’s strengths,
requiring it to interpret a statutory provision just as a court would. The
second model takes advantage of agency strengths in evaluating certain
inputs, like the focus of a statutory provision, but by reserving the
ultimate question of geographic scope to the court, this model ignores
the agency’s ability to consider regulatory alternatives and make
tradeoffs between statutory purposes and international comity. The
third model—deferring to an agency’s application of the presumption’s
two-step framework even if the result differs from what a court would
have done—allows an agency to bring all of its interpretive strengths to
bear. But it forces agencies into an analytical framework that the
Supreme Court developed with the weaknesses of courts, rather than the
strengths of agencies, in mind. By freeing agencies from that analytical
framework and deferring to their interpretations of geographic scope so
long as they considered the normative values reflected in the
presumption, the fourth model gives full effect to the interpretive
strengths that agencies enjoy. As the next Section illustrates, this is what
agencies have already been doing in defining the geographic scope of
statutes they administer.
C.

Three Examples

This Article turns now to consider in detail three examples of
extraterritorial regulation by administrative agencies, each of which is of
great practical importance: HSR’s “foreign commerce” exemptions;304
Regulation S under the Securities Act;305 and new regulations
implementing the Volcker Rule under the Dodd-Frank Act.306

303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 69.
See 16 C.F.R. §§ 802.50–.52 (2016).
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–.905 (2016).
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 44.6(e)(3) (2016).
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1. Hart-Scott-Rodino
The FTC’s regulations implementing HSR307 provide a good
example of an agency using general rulemaking authority to define the
geographic scope of a statute. HSR prohibits mergers and acquisitions
that exceed certain thresholds, unless notification is given to the
Department of Justice and the FTC and a waiting period has expired.308
The aim is to give these agencies the chance to review large mergers and
acquisitions before they occur in order to determine whether they would
violate the Clayton Act309 or the FTC Act.310 HSR’s text does not define
its geographic scope, instead speaking broadly of persons “engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce.”311 As the FTC
acknowledged when it issued its first regulations under HSR, the Act
“contains no special provision for transactions having foreign aspects.”312
HSR expressly gives the FTC, with the concurrence of the Justice
Department, rulemaking authority to implement the Act.313 This
authority includes the power to “define the terms used in this section;”314
to “exempt, from the requirements of this section, classes of persons,
acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not likely to violate the
antitrust laws;”315 and to “prescribe such other rules as may be necessary
and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.”316 Beyond the
authority contained in these grants, there is no express delegation to the
FTC of authority to define the geographic scope of HSR.

307. 15 U.S.C § 18a (2012).
308. Id.
309. Id. § 18 (prohibiting acquisitions that might “substantially . . . lessen competition,
or . . . tend to create a monopoly”).
310. Id. § 45(a) (prohibiting “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”). If the Department of Justice or FTC concludes
that an acquisition would violate the Clayton or FTC Acts, it may seek to enjoin the
acquisition. Id. § 18a(f).
311. Id. § 18a(a)(1). “Commerce” is defined in general terms as “trade or commerce
among the several States and with foreign nations.” Id. § 12(a).
312. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg.
33,450, 33,461 (July 31, 1978).
313. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d). Such delegations are rare in antitrust law, although one author has
argued for greater deference to administrative agencies in the antitrust context. See generally
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191 (2014) (arguing
that the Supreme Court is moving towards bringing antitrust law within normal administrative
law jurisprudence).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(2)(A).
315. Id. § 18a(d)(2)(B).
316. Id. § 18a(d)(2)(C).
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The FTC issued its first regulations implementing HSR in 1978.317
From the start it used its rulemaking authority to define the Act’s
geographic scope.318 It defined “commerce” to have the same meaning as
in the Clayton and FTC Acts.319 The FTC explained in the Federal
Register that because HSR’s commerce criterion “requires only that
either the acquiring or the acquired person be engaged in commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce,” HSR “permits coverage of a great
many transactions that have some or even predominant foreign
aspects.”320 To avoid HSR’s application to foreign transactions “with
only a minimal impact on United States commerce,”321 the FTC created
three foreign commerce exemptions: one for the acquisition of foreign
assets;322 a second for the acquisition of voting securities of a foreign
issuer;323 and a third for acquisitions by or from foreign government
entities.324
Although these regulations are phrased as exemptions, their
practical effect is actually to subject many acquisitions of assets outside
the United States and many acquisitions of securities in foreign
companies to the requirements of HSR. The foreign assets exemption,
for example, provides that HSR shall not apply to the acquisition of
“assets located outside the United States . . . unless the foreign assets the
acquiring person would hold as a result of the acquisition generated
sales in or into the U.S. exceeding $50 million (as adjusted) during the
acquired person’s most recent fiscal year.”325 In other words, the FTC’s
regulation provides that HSR does apply to assets located in foreign
countries if those assets generated U.S. sales above a certain threshold.
This interpretation holds even when both the buyer and the seller are
foreign.326 The foreign securities exemption similarly provides that HSR
317. See generally Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements,
43 Fed. Reg. 33,450 (July 31, 1978) (implementing HSR).
318. Congress amended HSR’s thresholds in 2001, and the FTC adopted new regulations
to implement these changes. Pub L. No. 106-552, § 630(a), 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-51 (2000)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2012).The new regulations did not change the
FTC’s basic interpretation of HSR’s geographic scope, however, maintaining each of the three
foreign commerce exemptions adopted in 1978.
319. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(l) (2016).
320. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg.
33,450, 33,497 (July 31, 1978).
321. Id.
322. 16 C.F.R. § 802.50.
323. Id. § 802.51.
324. Id. § 802.52.
325. Id. § 802.50(a).
326. This is confirmed by a further rule exempting transactions between foreign parties
that meet certain additional criteria. Specifically, (1) both parties must be foreign; (2) the
aggregate sales of both parties into the United States must be less than $110 million (as
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does apply to the acquisition of securities in foreign issuers whose U.S.
assets or U.S. sales exceed certain thresholds whether the buyer is a U.S.
person327 or a foreign person.328
It seems doubtful that a court asked to determine the geographic
scope of HSR without the benefit of the FTC’s guidance would have
landed in exactly the same place. But it also seems doubtful that a court
would cast aside the FTC’s guidance and seek to determine the
geographic scope of HSR for itself, whether by applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality or otherwise.329 As a general
matter, FTC regulations implementing HSR are evaluated for
reasonableness at Chevron step two.330 The D.C. Circuit has noted that
HSR gives the FTC “great discretion to define statutory terms and to
promulgate rules to facilitate Government identification of mergers and
acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws.”331
In determining the geographic scope of HSR, the FTC did not apply
the presumption against extraterritoriality.332 But the FTC did consider
both the “impact on United States commerce” and “considerations of
adjusted); (3) the aggregate assets of both parties in the United States must be less than $110
million (as adjusted); and (4) after the transaction, the acquiring person must not hold more
than $200 million (as adjusted) of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person. Id.
§ 802.50(b).
327. Id. § 802.51(a).
328. Id. § 802.51(b). As with the foreign assets exemption, see supra notes 325–26, there is
a further exception if both parties are foreign and the transaction meets additional criteria. 16
C.F.R. § 802.51(c).
329. Historically, the Supreme Court has not applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to antitrust statutes. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
798–99 (1993); see also id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have, however, found the
presumption to be overcome with respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that
the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.” (citations omitted)). On the other hand, Morrison
stated that the presumption applies “in all cases.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 261 (2010). It is possible to reconcile the antitrust cases with Morrison by noting that the
focus of U.S. antitrust laws is on preventing anticompetitive effects in the United States. See
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that antitrust
laws “reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations omitted)). Under RJR Nabisco, if whatever is
the focus of the provision occurs in the United States, applying the provision is considered
domestic and permissible. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101
(2016); supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
330. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198, 207–09 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(reviewing FTC regulation concerning patent rights).
331. Id. at 205.
332. In 1978, the presumption had fallen out of use. See Paul B. Stephan, Private Litigation
as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 40, 40 n.3 (2016) (noting that the
presumption “seemed to pass into desuetude” between Foley Bros. in 1949 and Aramco in
1991). Even after the presumption’s revival in 1991, its application to antitrust law remained
uncertain. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798–99 (failing to apply the presumption to the Sherman
Act).
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comity” when it decided to exempt “some acquisitions whose principal
impact is foreign.”333 In other words, the FTC’s regulations
implementing HSR reflect the same values—domestic conditions and
comity—that lie behind the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Under the fourth model for evaluating reasonableness discussed
above,334 the fact that the agency took into account the normative values
underlying the presumption should be sufficient to find its regulations
reasonable at Chevron step two.
2. Regulation S
Another example of an agency using general rulemaking authority
to define the geographic scope of a statute is Regulation S,335 which the
SEC first issued in 1990 to exempt certain transactions outside the
United States from the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities
Act.336
Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to sell a security
unless a registration statement is in effect.337 Section 5 does not define its
geographic scope, requiring only that a person have used “any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce” or “the mails.”338 Section 19 of the Act gives the SEC broad
authority to “make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter, including rules and
regulations governing registration statements and prospectuses for
various classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting,
technical, and trade terms used in this subchapter.”339 But § 19 does not
expressly give the SEC authority to define the geographic scope of the
registration requirements.340
In 1990, the SEC issued Regulation S, interpreting the registration
requirements not to apply to “offers and sales that occur outside the
United States.”341 The SEC explained in the Federal Register that
333. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg.
33,450, 33,497 (July 31, 1978).
334. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.
335. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–.905 (2016).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
337. Id. § 77e(a).
338. Id. § 77e(a)(1). Section 5 also prohibits the delivery of unregistered securities through
the mails or any means of transportation in interstate commerce. See id. § 77e(a)(2).
339. Id. § 77s(a).
340. See id. § 77s.
341. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2016). The SEC had previously stated that it would not take
enforcement action for failure to register securities of U.S. corporations distributed abroad to
foreign nationals if the distribution would not result in the securities flowing back into the
United States. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of
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[t]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S.
capital markets and investors purchasing in the U.S. market,
whether U.S. or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and the
reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets
justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the
United States to define requirements for transactions effected
offshore.342
In addition to its general statement, Regulation S creates two safe
harbors: (1) an issuer safe harbor for issuers, distributors, and their
affiliates;343 and (2) a resale safe harbor for others who purchase the
unregistered securities and the resell them.344 Each of these safe harbors
contains two basic requirements: (1) that the offer or sale be made in an
“offshore transaction;” and (2) that there be no “directed selling efforts”
in the United States.345
An “offshore transaction” is one in which no offer is made to a
person in the United States and either the buyer is outside the United
States or the transaction is executed on a foreign exchange.346 Whether a
buyer is outside the United States typically depends on the buyer’s
physical location.347 But Regulation S makes clear that offers and sales
“specifically targeted at identifiable groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such
as members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas” do not count as
offshore transactions,348 while offers and sales to certain non-U.S.
persons in the United States do count as offshore transactions.349
As for the second requirement, “[d]irected selling efforts” are any
activities that may “condition[] the market in the United States for any
of the securities being offered in reliance on this Regulation S.”350 Some
Underwriters as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828
(July 9, 1964).
342. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No.
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24,
1990).
343. 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (2016).
344. Id. § 230.904.
345. Id. §§ 230.903–.904. Both safe harbors contain additional conditions for certain
categories of securities—known as Category 2 and Category 3—in which there may be
substantial U.S. market interest. Id. § 230.903(b)(2)–(3); id. § 230.904(b)(1).
346. Id. § 230.902(h)(1).
347. Id. § 230.902(h)(1)(i).
348. Id. § 230.902(h)(2).
349. Id. § 230.902(h)(3). Specifically permitted are offers and sales to discretionary
accounts held for the benefit of non-U.S. persons by fiduciaries in the United States, see id.
§ 230.902(k)(2)(i), and offers and sales to international organizations, like the IMF, World
Bank, and United Nations, and their agencies, affiliates, and pensions plans, see id.
§ 230.902(k)(2)(vi).
350. Id. § 230.902(c)(1).
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are territorial—like placing an advertisement in a publication with a
general circulation in the United States,351 but others are
extraterritorial—like making offers to members of the U.S. armed forces
overseas.352 Furthermore, “to ameliorate the effect of the Regulation on
a foreign publication’s advertising practices where the United States
accounts for a limited portion of its circulation,”353 Regulation S
specifically exempts from the definition of directed selling efforts
“tombstone” advertisements in publications with less than twenty
percent of their circulations in the United States.354
Regulation S further extends the registration requirements of the
Securities Act extraterritorially by expressly providing that resales “by
the offshore purchaser” must also be made in compliance with
Regulation S.355 As mentioned above, Regulation S contains a resale
safe harbor that contains the same requirements of an offshore
transactions and no directed selling efforts in the United States.356
In sum, Regulation S defines the geographic scope of the Securities
Act’s registration requirements in great detail, and in ways that do not
always turn on physical location. It considers some sales in the United
States to be “offshore” and some sales abroad not to be. It exempts
some advertisements in the United States from the definition of
“directed selling efforts” but includes other activities outside the United
States. And it expressly extends the geographic scope of the registration
requirements to offshore purchasers who resell Regulation S securities.
It seems unlikely that a U.S. court asked to determine the
geographic scope of the Securities Act for itself would have arrived at
the same detailed scheme for its registration requirements, but the
Second Circuit has held that Regulation S is entitled to deference under
Chevron as the “reasonable interpretation of a statute that Congress has
entrusted the agency to administer.”357 Furthermore, in Morrison,

351. Id.
352. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No.
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,309 n.35 (April
24, 1990) (“Such targeted offerings also will be deemed to constitute directed selling efforts in
the United States.”).
353. Id. at 18,311.
354. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(c)(3)(iii).
355. Id. § 230.905.
356. Id. § 230.904.
357. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147
F.3d 118, 123 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
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Justice Scalia relied on Regulation S to determine the focus of the
Securities Act and, by extension, the Exchange Act.358
It is worth noting that the SEC did not apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality in developing Regulation S,359 but the SEC did
consider the intent of the statute “to protect the U.S. capital markets
and investors purchasing in the U.S. market” as well as “[p]rinciples of
comity and the reasonable expectations of participants in the global
markets.”360 The consideration of international comity appears to have
been genuine, for the SEC noted that the primary change it made in
response to comments was to give “further recognition to the doctrine of
comity” by reducing the restrictions applicable to foreign issuers relying
on the safe harbors.361 Under the fourth model for evaluating
reasonableness discussed above,362 a court should find Regulation S
reasonable at Chevron step two because the agency took into account
the normative values underlying the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
3. Volcker Rule
A final example concerns the geographic scope of the so-called
Volcker Rule contained in the Dodd-Frank Act.363 Much of Dodd-Frank
applies extraterritorially.364 Among other reasons, this was necessary
because of the mobility of major financial institutions and because it is
often necessary to regulate not just financial institutions but their
counterparties in order to address systemic risk.365
Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act—colloquially known
as the Volcker Rule—broadly prohibits banking entities from engaging
in proprietary trading.366 To avoid regulating the foreign operations of
358. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268–69 (2010) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012)).
359. Regulation S was first issued in 1990, a year before the revival of the presumption in
Aramco. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
360. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No.
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24,
1990).
361. Id. at 18,307.
362. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.
363. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010).
364. John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come
Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2014) (“Congress opted for an extraterritorial reach
for much of the Dodd-Frank Act.”); Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV.
965, 965 (2012) (noting the “significant extraterritorial scope of the derivatives regulation” in
Dodd-Frank).
365. Coffee, supra note 364, at 1260.
366. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012) (codifying Dodd-Frank Act § 619).
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foreign banks, however, the Volcker Rule included an exception to
permit banking entities “not directly or indirectly controlled” by U.S.
banking entities to engage in proprietary trading “provided that the
trading occurs solely outside of the United States.”367 Congress gave
federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission authority to “adopt rules to carry out this section.”368
In December 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the SEC issued a Joint Final Rule to implement the Volcker Rule.369
This regulation interprets the geographic scope of the Volcker Rule in
great detail, providing that it does not apply to foreign banking entities
(i.e., those not directly or indirectly controlled by U.S. banking entities)
so long as: (i) the banking entity purchasing or selling (including its
relevant personnel) is not located in the United States or organized
under U.S. law; (ii) the banking entity (including its relevant personnel)
making the decision to purchase or sell is not located in the United
States or organized under U.S. law; (iii) the purchase or sale is not
accounted for by a branch or affiliate located in the United States or
organized under U.S. law; (iv) no financing is provided by a branch or
affiliate located in the United States or organized under U.S. law; and
(v) the purchase or sale is not conducted through any U.S. entity (with
limited exceptions).370
Congress provided no direct guidance on what it meant by “solely
outside of the United States.”371 Accordingly, the agencies considered
the purpose of the Volcker Rule as a whole “to limit risks that
proprietary trading poses to the U.S. financial system”372 and the
purpose of the exception “to limit the extraterritorial application of
section 13 as it applies to foreign banking entities.”373 The agencies

367. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(H).
368. Id. § 1851(b)(2)(A). Congress also provided for the coordination of rulemaking by
different agencies. See id. § 1851(b)(2)(B). For a discussion of multiple-agency delegation and
Chevron, see generally William Weaver, Note, Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency
Chevron, 67 VAND. L. REV. 275 (2014).
369. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5536 (Jan. 31,
2014).
370. 12 C.F.R. § 44.6(e)(3) (2016).
371. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(h); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 5652 (“The statute does not define when a foreign banking entity’s trading occurs
solely outside of the United States.”).
372. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. at 5654–55.
373. Id. at 5655.
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identified these purposes by examining both the text of the statute and
its legislative history.374 The agencies also considered the extensive
comments they received on their proposed rule375 and substantially
modified their approach in response to those comments.376 No court has
yet reviewed the agencies’ interpretation of the Volcker Rule’s
geographic scope under Chevron, but it seems inconceivable that a court
would upset these regulations by applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality at Chevron step one or by finding the agencies’
interpretation unreasonable at Chevron step two. Certainly, under the
fourth model for evaluating reasonableness discussed above,377 these
regulations would be entitled to deference.
* * *
These three examples illustrate a number of important things about
extraterritorial regulation by agencies. First, such regulation typically
rests on a general grant of rulemaking authority rather than on a specific
grant of authority to define the geographic scope of a provision or to
regulate extraterritorially. Second, such regulation sometimes involves
provisions that expressly apply extraterritorially (like the Volcker Rule)
but often involves provisions that do not (like HSR and § 5 of the
Securities Act). When the presumption has been rebutted, agencies may
need to interpret the limitations on extraterritorial application that
Congress has imposed. When the presumption has not been rebutted,
regulation of foreign conduct may still be permissible if application of
the provision can still in some sense be considered “domestic.” Third,
agencies typically do not apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality in deciding how to regulate activity abroad, but
agencies do consider the normative values reflected in the presumption.
More specifically, agencies look carefully at the statutory policy, the
regulatory options available, and the ways to avoid unnecessary conflict
with other nations. Fourth, agencies are able to fashion fine-grained
regulatory schemes to accommodate both statutory purposes and
international comity in ways that courts could never duplicate.
If courts were to review these regulatory schemes by applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one, it seems
doubtful that any would survive. With respect to HSR, a court might
conclude that because the focus of antitrust laws is injury in the United
374. See id. at 5655 n.1517 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(1)); id. at 5655 n.1518 (citing 156
CONG. REC. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley)).
375. See id. at 5652–58 (responding to comments on proposed rule).
376. See id. at 5654 (“The Agencies have carefully considered these comments and have
determined to modify the approach in the final rule.”).
377. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.
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States,378 regulation of foreign transactions is permitted. But the
particular thresholds the FTC has chosen would be hard to justify under
the presumption alone. With respect to the Securities Act, a court
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality would almost
certainly conclude (as Morrison did379) that the focus of § 5 is
transactions in the United States, effectively precluding regulation of
resales or directed selling efforts outside the United States. With respect
to the Volcker Rule, a court would likely conclude that the presumption
was rebutted, but would be hard pressed to duplicate the agencies’ finegrained interpretation of “solely outside of the United States” without
some measure of deference.380
The fact that each of these regulations would almost certainly be
struck down if the presumption against extraterritoriality were applied
at Chevron step one demonstrates the practical need for courts to
evaluate the reasonableness of agency interpretations of geographic
scope at Chevron step two. As this Article has argued, the question
should not be whether the agency reached the same result a court
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality would, or even
whether the agency applied the presumption in reaching a different
conclusion. The question should be whether the agency’s interpretation
adequately considered the normative values underlying the
presumption. HSR’s exemptions, Regulation S, and the regulations
implementing the Volcker Rule all meet that test and should be upheld
as reasonable at Chevron step two.
VI. CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS
Having argued thus far that courts should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of a statute’s geographic scope, this Article
now turns briefly to consider two implications of its argument for
changing the extraterritorial reach of statutory provisions. Section VI.A
argues that agencies are free to change their own interpretations of a
statutory provision’s geographic scope, just as they are free to change
their statutory interpretations in other respects. Section VI.B argues that
agencies are also free to interpret the geographic scope of statutory
provisions differently than courts have done. Under existing doctrine,
this is certainly true with respect to the interpretations of lower federal

378. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating
that antitrust laws “reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign
anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations omitted)).
379. See supra Section III.D.
380. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(H) (2012).
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courts, and quite possibly with respect to interpretations of the Supreme
Court as well.
A. Changing Agency Interpretations
May an agency that has interpreted the geographic scope of a
statutory provision change its interpretation and thereby expand or
contract that provision’s extraterritorial reach? As a general matter, a
revised agency interpretation is entitled to no less deference under
Chevron than an original interpretation.381 Chevron itself involved a
revised interpretation of a statute.382 Of course, an unexplained change
might make an interpretation “arbitrary and capricious.”383 It might also
weaken the persuasive value of an agency interpretation under
Skidmore.384 But “if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a
reversal of policy, ‘change is not invalidating, since the whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a
statute with the implementing agency.’ ”385 Indeed, Chevron suggests
that agencies have an affirmative duty to reconsider and revise their
statutory interpretations.386
381. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework.”); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,
742 (1996) (“[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position
is not fatal.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)
(“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”). See generally David M.
Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of
Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1997) (discussing deference to revised agency
interpretations). Only occasionally has the Supreme Court suggested that inconsistency itself
might be a reason for less deference. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30
(1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s
earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held
agency view.” (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976))). For an argument that agencies should be required to
adhere to their previous interpretations, see Harold M. Greenberg, Why Agency
Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79 TENN. L. REV.
573, 580–611 (2012).
382. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 (noting that the agency had changed its interpretation of
the word “source”).
383. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–57 (1983)); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742.
384. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (quoting this passage from Skidmore).
385. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (quoting Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742).
386. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (“On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis.”).
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What is true for agency interpretations in general should also be
true for agency interpretations of geographic scope. In Aramco, the
Supreme Court applied the normal rules on revised agency
interpretations to the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII’s geographic
scope. Admittedly, the Court found that the EEOC’s revised
interpretation was not entitled to Skidmore deference, but that was
because—consistent with the normal rules387—the agency “offer[ed] no
basis in its experience for the change.”388 Nowhere did the Court suggest
that it was treating the revised interpretation less deferentially because it
had changed the statute’s geographic scope specifically.
Certainly, an agency may decide not to change its interpretation of
a statutory provision’s geographic scope over time. HSR’s “foreign
commerce” exemptions have remained substantively the same since
1978, even as Congress amended the act’s statutory thresholds.389 On the
other hand, the geographic scope that the SEC has given to the
registration requirements of the Securities Act has evolved. Some of that
evolution occurred prior to Regulation S, in no-action letters issued
under Securities Act Release No. 4708.390 But Regulation S made further
changes in existing SEC practice.391 As a reason for adopting the revised
regulation, the SEC cited changes in international securities markets
such as “the significant increase in offshore offerings of securities, as
well as the significant participation by U.S. investors in foreign
markets.”392 Looking to the future, it is certainly possible that the
geographic scope of the Volcker Rule might be revisited, assuming that
Congress does not decide to repeal the rule completely.393 Revised
interpretations of geographic scope must, of course, be reasonable. They

387. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
388. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991).
389. See supra notes 317–24 and accompanying text.
390. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Underwriters
as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (July 9, 1964);
see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No. 27,942;
Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24, 1990)
(describing application of Release 4708 in no-action letters).
391. See Offshore Offers and Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. at 18,316 (“Unlike no-action letters
pursuant to Release 4708, U.S. residency rather than U.S. citizenship is the principal factor in
the test of a natural person’s status as a U.S. person under Regulation S.”); id. at 18,318 (“The
offering restrictions . . . have been modified from those developed in no-action letters under
Release 4708.”).
392. See id. at 18,308.
393. See Gina Chon, Dodd-Frank Rollback May Fall Short of G.O.P. Hopes, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/business/dealbook/dodd-frank-rollbackmay-fall-short-of-gop-hopes.html (predicting that “the rewrite of Dodd-Frank will probably
be less than sweeping,” but noting that the Volcker Rule “could be softened or abandoned”).
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should also be explained.394 But so long as these requirements are met,
agencies are free to expand or contract the geographic scope of a
statutory provision by changing their interpretations.
B.

Changing Court Interpretations

Agencies are free not only to change their own interpretations of a
statutory provision’s geographic scope but also to depart from the
interpretations that federal courts applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality have made. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that
Chevron’s application “does not depend on the order in which the
judicial and administrative constructions occur.”395 The Court explained
that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”396 If
Brand X applies to Supreme Court decisions,397 and if the presumption
against extraterritoriality properly applies at Chevron step two, then it
seems clear that the SEC could interpret the geographic scope of § 10(b)
differently than Morrison did, so long as the SEC’s interpretation were
reasonable.398 The SEC could, for example, simply by adopting a
regulation, reinstate the conduct and effects tests for securities fraud
that the Supreme Court discarded in Morrison.399
Morrison did not hold that Congress had unambiguously addressed
the geographic scope of § 10(b). To the contrary, Morrison held that
Congress had not unambiguously addressed the geographic scope of
§ 10(b),400 which in turn made it necessary for the Court to determine the

394. See supra notes 383–84 and accompanying text.
395. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
396. Id. at 982.
397. See infra note 407 and accompanying text.
398. For discussion of different ways in which courts might address the reasonableness
question, see supra Section V.B.
399. In Dodd-Frank, Congress attempted to reverse Morrison and reinstate the conduct
and effects tests with respect to government enforcement actions by amending § 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (2012). One court has questioned whether
this amendment was effective because Congress amended the Exchange Act’s jurisdictional
provision rather than § 10(b) itself. See SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d
905, 909–17 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Of course, the SEC might read Congress’s decision not to
reinstate the conduct and effects tests with respect to private enforcement actions as a signal
that it should not do so by regulation.
400. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (concluding “there is no
affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially”).
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focus of the statute.401 Section 10(b) expressly gives the SEC authority to
prescribe “rules and regulations . . . necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors,”402 and the Court has
held that SEC interpretations of this provision are entitled to deference
at Chevron step two if they are reasonable.403 It is true that the Court did
not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of § 10(b)’s geographic scope in
Morrison, but that was because “the Commission did not purport to be
providing its own interpretation of the statute, but relied on decisions of
federal courts,”404 disqualifying its interpretation from deference at
Chevron step zero.405 If the SEC were to exercise its delegated authority
and issue regulations providing that § 10(b) applies whenever there is
significant conduct in the United States or substantial effects in the
United States,406 those regulations should be entitled to Chevron
deference so long as they were reasonable.
Of course, whether the SEC could depart from Morrison’s
interpretation depends on whether Brand X applies to Supreme Court
decisions, a question that the Supreme Court has yet to decide. Brand X
involved judicial construction by a lower court, and Justice Stevens
cautioned that the Court’s reasoning “would not necessarily be
applicable” to a decision by the Supreme Court.407 But whatever the
Court eventually decides with respect to its own decisions, Brand X
clearly establishes that administrative agencies are free to interpret the
geographic scope of statutes they administer in ways that diverge from
the interpretations of lower federal courts.
401. Id. at 266 (“[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United
States.”).
402. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
403. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002).
404. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272 (citing In re U.S. Sec. Clearing Corp., 52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14,
96 n.16 (1994); In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 78
n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975)).
405. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 521–22 (2009) (declining to defer to agency
interpretation when agency mistakenly considered itself bound by judicial precedent).
406. These are essentially the tests that Congress tried to adopt after Morrison for
government enforcement actions. See supra note 399. If the SEC were to adopt these tests by
regulation, it could similarly limit them to government enforcement actions or could expand
them to suits by private parties, since the regulations would rest not on any delegation in the
Dodd-Frank Act but on the original delegation of rulemaking authority in § 10(b).
407. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court had an opportunity to resolve this question in
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), but the plurality
concluded that the Court’s pre-Chevron interpretation of the statute had removed the
ambiguity, id. at 1843 (plurality opinion), while the dissenters thought that Congress’s
subsequent amendment of the statute had created a gap for the agency to fill, id. at 1852
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
Sometimes, courts have no choice but to interpret the geographic
scope of federal statutes for themselves. The presumption against
extraterritoriality gives courts a tool to avoid unnecessary conflict with
foreign interests, while considering the focus of congressional concern.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework provides significant guidance
to courts on how to apply the presumption.
But courts need not always go it alone. Many statutes with potential
extraterritorial applications are administered by federal agencies. These
agencies bring expertise to questions of geographic scope that courts
lack. Agencies are better at understanding the purposes of the statute,
the range of regulatory options available to effectuate those purposes,
and the potential conflicts with other nations that each of these options
presents. Moreover, agencies may adopt more fine-grained regulatory
schemes that maximize the achievement of statutory purposes while
minimizing conflicts with other nations. HSR, Regulation S, and the
Volcker Rule offer just three examples of detailed regulatory schemes
that courts would never have attempted to fashion on their own.
Of course, the fact that an agency has interpreted the geographic
scope of a statute does not mean that courts have no role to play. A
court must review an agency’s interpretation to make sure that it is
reasonable under Chevron or persuasive under Skidmore. In doing so, a
court should not require that the agency itself apply the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a court would do. But a court should require
that the agency consider the normative values that underlie the
presumption, particularly the need to avoid unnecessary conflicts with
foreign nations, taking into account both the statutory purposes and the
regulatory options. Courts should consider whether an agency’s
interpretation of a provision’s geographic scope is reasonable even if the
statute contains a clear indication of extraterritoriality.
Extraterritorial regulation is often complex and sensitive. Courts
should not give agencies a blank check. But courts should also not
presume that they are better positioned than agencies to make the many
complex judgments that extraterritorial regulation requires. Appropriate
deference to administrative agencies may well require courts to accept
interpretations of geographic scope that depart from those a court would
reach—or has already reached—by applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
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